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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
VOL. XXI

SUMMER 1968

DISCLAIMERS AND

NO. 1

THE MARITAL DEDUCTION:

A

NEED FOR ADEQUATE STATE LEGISLATION*
GILBERT L. FINNELL, JR.**

The anticipated devolution of a decedent's property may be altered
drastically by a number of causes. One foreseeable possibility is that an
intended beneficiary may refuse to accept all or part of a transfer. Such a
disclaimer may be motivated by various reasons, but likely it will be the
result of a post-death decision to rearrange the pattern of devolution in order
to accomplish an over-all tax savings for the family unit.
The recent amendment to the estate tax marital deduction section of the
Internal Revenue Codel provides such an opportunity for tax savings.2 A
*A table of headings and subheadings is appended at the end of this article.
**B.B.A., 1959, J.D. 1968 (from LL.B., 1963), Southern Methodist University; LL.M,
1967, Harvard University; Member of the Texas Bar; Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State

University.
1. Section 2056 (d) (2) of the rr. REv. CODE of 1954 was amended as follows: "(2) By
any other person.- If under this section an interest would, in the absence of a disclaimer
by any person other than the surviving spouse, be considered as passing from the decedent

to such person, and if a disclaimer of such interest is made by such person and as a result
of such disclaimer the surviving spouse is entitled to receive such interest, then - (A) if the
disclaimer of such interest is made by such person before the date prescribed for the filing
of the estate tax return and if such person does not accept such interest before making
the disclaimer, such interest shall, for purposes of this section, be considered as passing
from the decedent to the surviving spouse, and (B) if subparagraph (A) does not apply,
such interest shall, for purposes of this section, be considered as passing, not to the
surviving spouse, but to the person who made the disclaimer, in the same manner as if
the disclaimer had not been made." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §2056 (d) (2) [hereinafter cited
as CODE].
Before the amendment, CODE §2056 (d) (2) read as follows: "By any other person.- If
under this section an interest would, in the absence of a disclaimer by any person other
than the surviving spouse, be considered as passing from the decedent to such person, and
if a disclaimer of such interest is made by such person and as a result of such disclaimer
the surviving spouse is entitled to receive such interest, then such interest shall, for the
purposes of this section, be considered as passing, not to the surviving spouse, but to the
person who made the disclaimer, in the same manner as if the disclaimer had not been
made." CODE §2056 (d) (2), 68A Stat. 395 (1954).
2. This article is restricted to the planning opportunities available to estates of decedents dying on or after Oct. 4, 1966. For estates of decedents dying on or after Oct. 1,
1963, and before Oct. 4, 1966, the law provides: "In the case of the estate of a decedent
dying before the date of the enactment of this Act for which the date prescribed for the
filing of the estate tax return (determined without regard to any extension of time for
filing) occurs on or after January 1, 1965, if, under section 2056 of the Internal Revenue
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"disclaimer" of an interest in property will have the effect of "passing" the
disclaimed property from the decedent to the surviving spouse if, as a result
of the disclaimer, the surviving spouse is entitled to receive the interest.3
Thus, affirmative post-death action by an intended beneficiary can result in
augmentation of the estate tax marital deduction. 4
The amendment represents a significant step toward placing taxpayers
who reside in noncommunity property states and those who reside in community property states in postures of equality. 5 Nevertheless, it raises several
questions and problems. The purposes of this article are to explore the consequences that may flow to the taxpayer who attempts to utilize the new
disclaimer provision, and to suggest the type of state statutes needed to ensure
that the taxpayer's attempt will have the maximum chance of success.
Congress had at least two distinct approaches that it could have taken in
legislating in the disclaimer area. One approach would have been to establish
a federal standard for the circumstances under which a refusal to accept an
interest would be treated as a valid disclaimer. 6 Congress chose, however,
Code of 1954, an interest would, in the absence of a disclaimer by any person other than
the surviving spouse, be considered as passing from the decedent to such person, and if a
disclaimer of such interest is made by such person and as a result of such disclaimer the
surviving spouse is entitled to receive such interest, then such interest shall, for purposes
of such section, be considered as passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse, if - (I)
the interest disclaimed was bequeathed or devised to such person, (2) before the date prescribed for the filing of the estate tax return such person disclaimed all bequests and devices
[sic] under such will, and (3) such person did not accept any property under any such
bequest or devise before making the disclaimer. The amount of the deductions allowable
under section 2056 of such Code by reason of this subsection, when added to the amount
of the deductions allowable under such section without regard to this subsection, shall not
exceed the greater of (A) the amount of the deductions which would be allowable under
such section without regard to the disclaimer if the surviving spouse elected to take
against the will, or (B) an amount equal to one-third of the adjusted gross estate (within
the meaning of subsection (c) (2) of such section)." 80 Stat. 832, § (c) [I U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1029-30 (1966)].
3. CODE §2056 (a) provides that only an interest that "passes or has passed" from the
decedent to the surviving spouse can qualify for the marital deduction. As a result of the
amendment, a disclaimed interest that passes to the surviving spouse will meet the "passing"
requirement, and if all other requirements of §2056 are met, the disclaimed interest will

qualify for the estate tax marital deduction. See generally 1 A.

CASNER,

ESTATE PLANNING

827-31 (3d ed. 1961, Supp. 1968) [hereinafter cited as CASNER].
4. The estate tax marital deduction has been summarized as follows: "[T]he marital
deduction, in general, permits the deduction of up to one-half of the adjusted gross estate
for property passing to a surviving spouse." S. REP. No. 1599, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966),
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3112 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Senate Finance Comm.
Rep.]. See generally 1 CASN-R 783-874.
5. Cf. Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 1958); S. REP. No.
1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948-1 Cus. BuLL. 285, 305.
6. A federal standard that would achieve uniformity of treatment among the states
has been recommended by many: See, e.g., Frankel, How To Prepare for Renunciations,
Widow's Elections, and Related Problems, in 3 J. LASSER, ESTATE TAX TECHNIQUEs 2191, 2207
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Frankel]; R. STEVENS & G. MAxFtI.D, Tn FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIr TAXES 305 (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as STEPHENS & MAXFIELD); Ekman, Can a
Transferee Avoid Gift or Estate Tax Liability by Renouncing a "'Transferby Operation of
Law," N.Y.U. 11TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 527, 532 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Ekman]; Sayles, Re-
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constito continue to rely on local law for the factual determination of what
7
property.
in
interest
an
of
"acceptance"
or
tutes a valid "disclaimer"
Although it seems that Congress failed to avail itself of the opportunity
to ensure uniformity of treatment, the broad language of the statute coupled
with the apparent congressional purpose of alleviating existing inequities
and discrimination strongly suggest that the courts will construe the statute
broadly8 Thus, the major, but perhaps insurmountable, obstacle remaining
for some taxpayers is the outmoded law of disclaimers that exists in most of
the states.
A few states have recognized the unfortunate federal tax results caused
by uncertain or inadequate state law and, accordingly, have passed legislation." The Minnesota statutes, for example, are comprehensive and represent
the type of statute that should alleviate most of the problems caused by state
law.10
nunciations-Estateand Gift Tax Problems, U. So. CAL. 1953 TAX INsr. 531, 538 [hereinafter cited as Sayles]; Note, Disclaimers in Federal Taxation, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1047, 1051
(1950); Note, Taxation: Disclaimers Under Federal and Minnesota Law, 51 MINN. L. REv.
907, 921 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, 51 MINN. L. REv.].
[M]ust be a valid refusal under
7. "A disclaimer, for the purposes of this bill ....
State law .... ." Senate Finance Comm. Rep. at 3116. Compare the discussion, id. at 3113-14,
concerning disclaimers for gift tax purposes, with the discussion, id. at 3115-16, concerning
disclaimers for marital deduction purposes.
The local law test is also used in CODE §§2041 (a) (2), 2514 (b) with respect to disclaiming
or renouncing a general power of appointment created after Oct. 21, 1942: "A disclaimer or
renunciation of a general power of appointment is not considered to be a release of the
power. The disclaimer or renunciation must be unequivocal and effective under local
law." Treas. Reg. §§25.2514-3 (c) (5), 20.2041-3 (d) (6) (1958).
8. Cf. Senate Finance Comm. Rep. at 3114, which states: "Cases in the estate tax area
have arisen where the nonrecognition of a disclaimer, which resulted in property passing
to surviving spouses, has given rise to inequities and discrimination. Where the beneficiary
disclaims his right to receive property and, as a result, the property is received by a surviving spouse, it is difficult to see why a larger tax should be recovered from the estate
than would be true where the property goes directly to the surviving spouse (rather than
indirectly as a result of a disclaimer). In both cases the economic effect of the transaction
is the same. Moreover, frequently the failure to make provision for the marital deduction
in the first instance stems from an absence of knowledge concerning estate tax law by the
decedent. This is an area of the law which, of necessity, contains complexities and frequently is not fully understood by an individual preparing his own will. A special problem
is created by the fact that it is possible to obtain a lesser marital deduction than intended
solely because of a failure to determine the exact interrelationship of the different estate
tax provisions of present law." And see the reason for the additional changes by the
Senate: "[P]roperty passing to a surviving spouse by way of a disclaimer should be treated
no differently than where the property passes directly to the surviving spouse. For that
reason, it does not apply the limitations contained in the House bill to disclaimers made in
the future (these limited the application of the House bill to disclaimers of interests bequeathed or devised to a person, required the disclaimer by a person of all bequests and
devises in his favor, and limited the maximum marital deduction available by reason of
disclaimers)." See also infra note 210.
9. See infra note 147 listing statutes authorizing an heir to disclaim; infra note 190

listing statutes authorizing donee of power of appointment to disclaim the power.
10. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§501211, 525.532 (Supp. 1966) (see infra Appendix for excerpts
from the statutes). Although these statutes were approved May 21, 1965, the impetus for
the legislation was undoubtedly due to the result reached in Hardenbergh v. Commissioner,
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The estate planner risks serious consequences if he advises that a disclaimer be made in a state where the requirements and effects of a disclaimer
are uncertain." If a given issue has not been decided, the planner can only
predict the position that the courts of such state are likely to take. Even if a
lower court judgment is obtained, which ostensibly determines a controverted
property question relating to the taxpayer, the planner must face the real
possibility that the federal court will disregard the state court decision to
the extent that its decision indirectly affects the determination of federal tax
liability. 12
PART I.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A VALID DISCLAIMER ?

The Code does not define a disclaimer for purposes of section 2056 (d) (2).
The only specific requirements are that disclaimer be made before the date
prescribed for filing of the estate tax return and that disclaimer be made
before the interest is accepted.13
The Senate Finance Committee Report casts some additional light: "A
disclaimer ... is a complete and unqualified refusal to accept some or all of
the rights to which one is entitled. It must be a valid refusal under state law
and be made without consideration."' 4 In a footnote the report adds: "It is
not material for this purpose whether a particular State law uses the term
'disclaimer' or uses another term describing the same legal effect. All that is
necessary ... is a refusal, made without consideration, which is valid under
State law and by reason of which the interest 'disclaimed' is received by the
surviving spouse either by operation of law or other provision made by the
decedent."15
Ultimate determination of what constitutes a "disclaimer" requires an
investigation of the controlling state law. It is here that the planner must
198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952), discussed following infra
subheading Interests Passing by Intestate Succession or Otherwise by Operation of Law. A
thoughtful analysis of interpretive problems created by the Minnesota legislation is found
in Note, 51 MINN. L. REv. 922-41.
11. See supra note 7, infra notes 34, 35, and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967), noted in 53 A.B.A.J. 951
(1967), 34 BROOKLYN L. REV. 156 (1967), 1967 DUKE L.J. 1055, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 259 (1967),
12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 160 (1967), 36 U. CINC. L. REv. 728 (1967), 21 VAND. L. REv. 161 (1967),
70 W. VA. L. REV. 87 (1967). See generally Braverman & Gerson, The Conclusiveness of State
Court Decrees in Federal Tax Litigation, 17 TAX L. REV. 545 (1962); Sacks, The Binding
Effect of Nontax Litigation in State Courts, N.Y.U. 21sr INST. ON Far. TAX. 277 (1963);
Stephens &-Freeland, The Role of Local Law and Local Adjudications in Federal Tax Controversies, 46 MINN. L. REV. 223, 242-51 (1961); Note, The Binding Effect of a Nonadversary State Court Decree in a Federal Tax Determination, 33 FORDHAM L. Rav. 705 (1965);
Note, Effect of State Court Decrees in Federal Tax Litigation: A Proposal for Judicial
Reform, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1963).
13. CoDE §2056 (d) (2) (A). The following CoDE sections contain provision for renunciation or disclaimer: §§678 (d), 2041 (a) (2), 2055 (a), 2056 (d), 2514(b). It is instructive to
review the existing regulations under these sections: Treas. Reg. §1.678(d)-l (1956);
§§20.2041-3 (d) (6), 20.2055-2 (c), 25.2514-3 (c) (5) (1958).
14. Senate Finance Comm. Rep. at 3116.
15. Id.
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proceed with caution because of lack of uniformity among the states.1 6 Less
than twenty-five per cent of the states have statutes on the subject, 7 so it
is necessary to look to the multifarious judicial decisions for guidance.
Refusal To Accept
Whether a disclaimer has occurred, or can occur, may turn on whether
there has been an acceptance of the interest."" The Senate Finance Committee
Report illustrates the meaning of "acceptance" as follows: "This means, for
example, that a person who has been receiving benefits under a trust during
a decedent's lifetime may not disclaim the interest . . . upon the decedent's
death. . . . What constitutes an acceptance is . . . a question of fact."'' 9
Judicial elaboration of "acceptance" under existing Code sections 20 must now
be examined.
In Commissioner v. Vease's Estate,2 1 beneficiaries of a valid will wanted
to rearrange property interests in order to fulfill the objectives of an unexecuted will (prepared by testator just before his death), creating interests in
persons who would not have taken otherwise. 22 The court held that the
power to barter and direct the rearrangement is inconsistent with a true
disclaimer; that such a transfer is more properly characterized as an acceptance
and release.23
Release as contrasted to disclaimer was also the issue in Keesler v. North
Carolina National Bank, 24 in which W accepted a legacy under H's will and
received benefits for twelve years before attempting a partial renunciation.
The court held that W's act did not constitute a renunciation: "She has
merely released the trustee from the duty of paying any of these benefits
from the principal and income of the specified shares of stock, and relinquished whatever rights she had to require that the payment of benefits be
25
made from this stock."
Estate of Mabel E. Morton26 concerned acceptance of life insurance proceeds. W was entitled to the lump-sum proceeds, but elected an optional mode
16. Cf. text accompanying supra notes 6, 7.
17. See infra notes 147, 190.
18. The Senate Finance Comm. Rep. at 3116 and Treasury regulations under existing
disclaimer sections, e.g., Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1 (c) (1958), use the phrase "refusal to accept"

as synonymous with "disclaimer."
19. Senate Finance Comm. Rep. at 3115.
20. See supra note 13 for CODE sections containing provision for renunciation or dis-

claimer.
21. 314 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1963).
22. A true will compromise was not involved. For a discussion of the effects of compromise agreements, see I CASNmEat 74; Frankel at 2193.
23. For a discussion of the distinctions between relinquishments or releases and disclaimers or renunciations, see Sayles at 531. Renunciation and disclaimer are used interchangeably throughout this article.
24. 256 N.C. 12, 122 S.E.2d 807 (1961), See also Smith v. Bank of Delaware, Del. 219 A.2d 576 (1966), aff'g 42 Del. Ch. 335, 211 A.2d 591 "(Ct. Ch. 1965).
25. 256 N.C. at 19, 122 S.E.2d at 813.
26. 12 T.C. 380 (1949).
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of settlement, requesting none of the principal. At her death the proceeds
were included in her gross estate as a transfer of property under section 811
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The court said: "[S]he accepted the
rights and interests accorded her, more particularly the right to do as she
wished with the proceeds, to which she was unqualifiedly entitled. She thereupon exerted complete dominion, ownership, and control of the proceeds,
with only self-imposed limitation or restriction. It was only by her acknowledgment and acceptance of her right to the proceeds under the policies that
decedent could avail herself of one of the optional modes of settlement therein
provided. Her renunciation of her right to the proceeds would have wiped
27
out her right to exercise one of the settlement options."
Other examples of acts and conduct that have been held to constitute
acceptance include entering into possession of property, living there, treating
it as one's own;28 and joining in a trust instrument with settlor, evidencing
29
intention to become cotrustee and beneficiary.
Normally, of course, a beneficiary does not consider whether he should
accept, unless he is motivated to consider a disclaimer in order to save taxes,
avoid claims of creditors, or accomplish some similar purpose. Nevertheless,
if the devise or bequest is beneficial, his acceptance is usually presumed.30
The presumption is rebuttable, but the burden of proof is on the one alleging
the disclaimer.31 On the other hand, if the devise or bequest is onerous,
there is no presumption of acceptance, and the burden of proof is on the
one alleging the acceptance.

32

Finally, ownership may be imposed as a matter of law -there may be
no opportunity to refuse to accept. This anomaly was highlighted in the
famous case of Hardenbergh v. Commissioner33 where federal gift tax was
imposed upon the theory that an intestate taker's interest vests by operation
of law and that an attempted renunciation of such an interest, although
effective to pass title, is a taxable "transfer." Problems posed by Hardenbergh
are developed throughout this article. There seems to be no reason to assume
that a disclaimer for purposes of section 2056 (d) (2) will be viewed differently
than a disclaimer for gift tax purposes.2 4 If a purported disclaimer is treated
27. Id. at 383.
28. Blake v. Blake, 147 Ore. 43, 31 P.2d 768 (1934).
29. Cerf v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1944).
30. In re Pellicer's Estate, 118 So. 2d 59 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1960); People v. Flanagin, 331
Ill. 203, 162 N.E. 848 (1928); Lehr v. Switzer, 213 Iowa 658, 239 N.W. 564 (1931); Bouse v.
Hull, 168 Md. 1, 176 A. 645 (1935); Lawes v. Lynch, 7 N.J. Super. 584, 72 A.2d 414 (1950);
Bradford v. Leake, 124 Tenn. 312, 137 S.W. 96 (1911); Bacon v. Barber, 110 Vt. 280, 6 A.2d
9 (1939); In re Berry's Estate, 29 Wis. 2d 506, 139 N.W.2d 72 (1966). See also Annot., 93
A.L.R.2d 8 (1964).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
34. Cf. supra note 7 and accompanying text. But cf. I CASNER at 828 in the 1967 supplement to note 92: After quoting the language from the Senate Finance Comm. Rep. set
forth in the text accompanying supra note 15, the treatise continues: "If in the case of an
intestacy, for example, State law regards a refusal to accept an intestate share as the equivalent of taking it and transferring it to the one who would take if the disclaiming party
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as a taxable "transfer" for gift tax purposes because of the state law effect
of the devolution of intestate property, the disclaimer will be ineffective in
qualifying additional property for the estate tax marital deduction.35
PartialDisclaimer
A problem closely related to the acceptance question is whether one can
accept part and disclaim the balance3 6 The House of Representatives proposed that all bequests and devises must be disclaimed; 37 however, the Senate
disagreed, and the enacted bill does not contain the all requirement. 3 As
the Senate Finance Committee Report states: "[A] person disclaiming with
respect to the estate of a decedent dying after date of enactment may accept
an undivided interest in a property and still disclaim the remainder within
the meaning of the bill."39 But, again, it must be remembered that the
partial disclaimer will be valid for purposes of section 2056 (d) (2) only if
it is valid under the controlling state law.40
The judicial development of partial disclaimers has centered on two
factual distinctions: (1) whether there are separate and distinct gifts or a
were deceased, presumably that would be a disclaimer that would cause the property to be
treated as passing from the decedent to his spouse if she picked up an interest as a result
of such action. This position means that a disclaimer made to improve the marital deduction picture could, under some circumstances, subject the disclaiming party to a federal gift
tax (see the Hardenbergh case.. .)." This language seems to suggest that it may be possible
to have an effective disclaimer for purposes of CODE §2056 (d) (2) although not for purposes
of the gift tax. Nevertheless, it is the position of this article that the state law test of
a valid disclaimer would be the same in the case of the gift tax or the marital deduction.
That is, if the disclaimer subjected the disclaiming party to gift tax, under the Hardenbergh rationale, the purported disclaimer would also be ineffective for purposes of CODE
§2056 (d) (2).
35. Under Proposed Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1, 22 Fed. Reg. 53 (1957), there had been
concern that a partial disclaimer, though effective under local law might attract gift tax
liability because of the explicit statement in the regulation that a partial disclaimer would
not be a complete and unqualified refusal. Cf. Ward, PracticalAspects of Disclaimers by
Donees, Heirs, and Legatees, N.Y.U. 16TH INsr. oN FED. TAx. 1037, 1041 (1958). However,
the final regulations were changed as follows: "In any case where a refusal is purported to
relate to only a part of the property, the determination of whether or not there has been
a complete and unqualified refusal to accept ownership will depend on all of the facts and
circumstances in each particular case, taking into account the recognition and effectiveness
of such a purported refusal under the local law." Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1 (c) (1958). Thus,
there do not appear to be circumstances in which a disclaimer could be effective for
either gift tax purposes or marital deduction purposes without being effective for the
other. But cf. supra note 34.
36. See generally 5 J. MERTrrs, THE LAw OF FEDERAL GarT AND EsrATE TAXATION §34.16
(1959, Supp. 1967) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS]; 6 W. PAGE, Wrus §49.10 (Sd ed. W.
Bowe 9- D. Parker 1960, Supp. 1967) [hereinafter cited as PAGE]; Lentz, Income and Gift
Tax Effects of Renunciation of a Bequest or Inheritance, N.Y.U. 21sT INsT. OF FED. TAX.
313, 318-20 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Lentz]; Sayles at 545-48.
37. Senate Finance Comm. Rep. at 3112-13.
38. See CODE §2056 (d) (2).
39. Senate Finance Comm. Rep. at 3115.
40. See supranote 7 and accompanying text.
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single, aggregate gift; 41 and (2) whether the gifts or gift are all beneficial or
part beneficial and part onerous.

42

The only point that the courts seem to agree upon is that the recipient
of a single, aggregate gift cannot accept the beneficial part and disclaim the
onerous part.4 3 This principle has wide support even if the gifts are separate
and distinct. 44 Nevertheless, the court in State Banking Co. v. Hinton4 held
to the contrary. The Hinton case is typical of the context within which the
beneficial-onerous distinction has often arisen. 46 The beneficiary received
a devise of real estate in one section of the will and received bank stock
subject to assessments exceeding the value of the stock in a separate section.
The court permitted the beneficiary to accept the real estate and disclaim
the bank stock.
A majority of the courts agree that the recipient of two separate and
distinct gifts, both of which are beneficial, can accept one gift and disclaim
the other.4

There is, however, authority contrary to this position.41

The least settled, but potentially most important issue is whether the
recipient of a single, beneficial gift can accept part and disclaim part. This
was the issue in Bronstein Estate,49 where W renounced all "in excess of one41. See generally 6 PAGE §49.10; Annot. 93 A.L.R.2d 8 (1964).
42. See generally 6 PAGE §49.7; Annot. 93 A.L.R.2d 8 (1964).
43. E.g., Seizer v. Seizer, 146 Kan. 273, 69 P.2d 708 (1937); Ryan v. Monast, 67 R.I. 377,
24 A.2d 615 (1942); Bacon v. Barber, 110 Vt. 280, 6 A.2d 9 (1939).
44. E.g., Foulkes v. Foulkes, 173 Ark. 188, 293 S.W. 1 (1927); Selzer v. Seizer, 146 Kan.
273, 69 P.2d 708 (1937); Cochran's Ex'r & Trustee v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 656, 44
S.W.2d 603 (1931); Bacon v. Barber, 110 Vt. 280, 6 A.2d 9 (1939).
45. 178 Ga. 68, 172 S.E. 42 (1933).
46. Cf. Annot. 93 A.L.R.2d 8, 31-34 (1964).
47. E.g., Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641
(1933); Coleman v. Burns, 103 N.H. 313, 171 A.2d 33 (1961); In re Merritt's Estate, 155 App.
Div. 228, 140 N.Y.S. 13 (1913); In re Matthiessen's Will, 175 Misc. 466, 23 N.Y.S.2d 802
(Sur. Ct. 1940).
48. E.g., Cochran's Ex'r & Trustee v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 656, 44 S.W.2d 603 (1931).
49. 86 Pa. D. & C. 150 (1953). See also Bank of Delaware v. Smith, 42 Del. Ch. 335,
211 A.2d 591 (1965), afj'd, Del.
219 A.2d 576 (1966) in which the issue was whether
the income beneficiary of a trust could renounce 60% of the income after having accepted
the income therefrom for several years. The court correctly held that the renunciation was
invalid but turned its decision on the question of partial disclaimer. The conceded acceptance should have been determinative. Thus, the following language, though the admitted grounds of the decision, was unnecessary to the conclusion reached: "It seems clear
that a beneficiary of a single, aggregate gift lacks the power, absent evidence of a testamentary intent to the contrary, to accept part and reject part thereof. . . . Since a donee
cannot accept part and disclaim part of a unitary gift at its inception, it would seem to
follow, a fortiori, that she cannot reject part of the gift of income from a single such
source after having accepted it for many years." 211 A.2d at 593. The case was affirmed in
Smith v. Bank of Delaware ------Del.
219 A.2d 576 (1966), with the following comment:
"This Court will not reverse a correct judgment even though a wrong reason was assigned
by the lower Court .... We are here dealing with a spendthrift trust and are accordingly
concerned only with the rules applicable to such a trust." 219 A.2d at 577. The court then
stated the general rule to be that the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust, having once elected
to accept its benefits, may not thereafter renounce those benefits unless permitted to do so
by the trust instrument. It held: "The reasons which prevent the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust from renouncing those benefits in toto apply equally to the renunciation of a
part of them." Id. at 578.
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fourth of the total value." She obviously intended to take part of the renounced share by intestacy, for she added that if it was determined that
she would not receive her intestate share of the renounced part, the renunciation would be effective "only with respect to one-half of the total estate ...
it being [her] intention to accept no more than half such estate. . . ." The
court held that W could renounce her legacy in part 50 and that the renounced
share would go. by intestacy since W was residuary legatee. 51
Notwithstanding the Bronstein decision, there are many ramifications of
partial disclaimers that may have to be litigated before the boundaries are
clearly drawn for purposes of section 2056 (d) (2). To illustrate some of the
complexities, consider the various ways in which an interest in property
can be carved to produce smaller interests. The interest can be divided into
concurrent interests, for example, accepting an undivided interest and disclaiming the remaining undivided interest. This type of partial disclaimer
2
appears to have congressional approval if it meets the state law requirement.5
But can an interest be divided into successive interests, for example, accepting
a remainder interest and "disclaiming" a life estate? It is doubtful that
Congress considered this latter possibility.
If a disclaimer producing successive interests is held to be valid, there
will be excellent planning potentialities. For example, consider the following
two illustrations.
First, suppose that H specifically devises Blackacre to S in fee simple
absolute, the entire residual estate being left to W. S accepts only a remainder
interest in Blackacre and "disclaims" a life estate for the life of W. Assume
for purposes of this illustration that the "disclaimed" interest will thereby
pass to W by virtue of the residuary clause 5s What are the tax consequences,
50. Id. at 152, citing In re Merritt's Estate, 155 App. Div. 228, 140 N.Y.S. 13 (1913).
51. See text following infra subheading (a). Interests Passing by Intestate Succession or
Otherwise by Operation of Law for problems of intestate succession.
52. "[M]ay accept an undivided interest in a property and still disclaim the remainder
within the meaning of the bill." Senate Finance Comm. Rep. at 3115. See supra note 7.
53. To be sure, a disclaimed specific legacy or devise would normally pass under the
residuary clause to W. See text accompanying infra notes 163, 164. And, arguably, a disclaimed life estate, as a freehold estate in land, should have the same capacity to "pass"
into the residuary. However, when a life estate is disclaimed, the interest is usually
thought of as having "failed," and the question usually presented is whether the remainder
interest may accelerate. See text accompanying infra notes 178-83. See generally 5 AMERUCAN
LAw OF PROPERTY §§21.37-21.48 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
Nevertheless, in at least one jurisdiction, a disclaimed life estate may pass by intestacy if
there is no residuary clause, Rocker v. Metzger, 171 Ind. 364, 86 N.E. 403 (1908); Cool v.
Cool, 54 Ind. 225 (1876); Rusing v. Rusing, 25 Ind. 63 (1865); Cassedy v. Padgett, 99 Ind.
App. 239, 190 N.E. 133 (1934), or by the residuary clause if there is one. Garrison v. Day,
36 Ind. App. 543, 76 N.E. 188 (1905).
Furthermore, in any jurisdiction that still recognizes the doctrine of destructibility of
contingent remainders, e.g., Florida, Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249 (1931); In
re Rentz Estate, 152 So. 2d 480 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963) (dictum), one should ask whether a
contingent remainder should be destroyed if the life tenant disclaims before the remainder
vests. The writer in American Law of Property says the remainder should not be destroyed,
but should be viewed as though the life interest had never been limited and recharacterized as an executory interest. 5 AMERIcAN LAw oF PRoPERTY §21.39 (A.J. Casner ed.
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assuming that such a "disclaimer" is valid under local law and section
2056 (d) (2)? Apparently, the actuarial value of the remainder interest will
be includible in S's gross estate at his death if W is then living, 54 or the
entire value will be includible if W predeceases S.55 Of course, the entire
value is already includible in H's gross estate, 56 and the life estate "passing"
to W does not qualify for the marital deduction since it is a nonqualifying
terminable interest.5 7 However, the absence of gift tax consequences should
still make the disclaimer route worth pursuing:58 the life estate "disclaimed"
by S "passes"59 to W without gift tax liability,60 and the value of the life
estate is removed from (or more precisely, was never received by) S's gross
estate.
Conversely, what are the tax consequences if such an attempted disclaimer
is found to be invalid under local law and section 2056 (d) (2)? The entire
value of Blackacre is includible in H's estate, 61 with no marital deduction; and
62
the entire value of Blackacre will be includible in S's estate at his death.
63
Gift tax will be applicable to the actuarial value of the life estate transferred,
64
assuming that a bona fide relinquishment of a life estate has occurred.
1952). If such a characterization occurs, presumably there would be an undisposed-of fee
simple subject to a springing executory interest in the heretofore-referred-to "contingent
remaindermen." In any event, the undisposed-of defeasible fee should now pass under the
normal rules referred to in text accompanying infra notes 163, 164.
A major import of these possibilities, i.e., that a disclaimed life estate might pass by
the residuary clause to W either in the form of an estate pur autre vie or a fee simple
subject to a springing executory interest, is that such an interest would be a "tainted
terminable interest," not qualifying for the estate tax marital deduction, CODE §2056 (b)(1).
And if W's gift was a pecuniary legacy to be satisfied out of the residuary, the disqualified
interest would be deemed to have been used first in satisfying the legacy, possibly reducing
the marital deduction from the amount before the disclaimer. CODE §2056(b)(2). See generally I CASNER at 832-36. Such a result can be mitigated, of course, by including in the
instrument a provision such as the one suggested by Professor Casner: "Only assets which
qualify for the estate tax marital deduction shall be used to pay estate tax marital deduction gifts hereunder or shall be sold to raise cash to make such payment." Id. at 835.
54. CODE §2033.
55. Id.
56. Includible, by hypothesis, under CODE §2033.
57. CODE §2056 (b) (1). See generally 1 CASNER at 832-36.
58. Treas. Reg. 25.2511-1 (c) (1958) states: "[A] refusal to accept ownership does not
constitute the making of a gift ...." CODE §2501 imposes a gift tax on the "transfer" of
property by gift, and §2511 imposes the tax "whether the gift is direct or indirect ...."
Nevertheless, there has been no serious doubt since Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F2d 914 (6th
Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933) (valid disclaimer under state law held not
"transfer" in contemplation of death) that a disclaimed interest is not a taxable transfer
for gift tax purposes. See Frankel at 2198-200.
59. CODE §2056 (e) (1).
60. See supra note 58.
61. Includible, by hypothesis, under CODE §2033.
62. CODE §2033.
63. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1 (e) (1958).
64. If the purported "disclaimer" to W was shown to be a sham designed to shift income to W while maintaining control of Blackacre in S, the tax consequences could be
worse: the transfer might be treated as an anticipatory assignment of income. See Harrison
v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Galt v. Coin-
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A second illustration may focus more clearly the problems surrounding
a partial disclaimer of successive interests. One writer has posed the following
hypothetical fact situation: "Husband's will provides for a legal life estate
to wife with remainder in undivided halves to his adult son and daughter.
• . . [S]on and daughter disclaim in favor of mother a [Code section]
2056 (b) (5) power as to Parcel A [a parcel of realty owned by H in fee simple
absolute]." 6 5 The proposed technique raises several questions that are considered later in this article. For example: Is a power of appointment an
"interest in property" within the meaning of section 2056 (d) (2) ?6G Would
67
the "disclaimed" power, which did not exist before the purported disclaimer,
"'pass" from the decedent to the mother by virtue of one of the categories
listed in section 2056 (e) - for example, by bequest (the residuary clause) 68
or by operation of law (assuming that W was H's sole heir) ?69
The very process of phrasing the foregoing illustrations suggests a conclusion that, although it is not essential that all the bequests and devises be
accepted - that, indeed, one might even accept an undivided interest in a
devise and disclaim the remaining interest 70 - Congress did not intend that
a partial disclaimer of successive interests should be permitted if it is necessary for the disclaimant to create out of an accepted interest the interest

disclaimed.71 Such a conclusion seems plausible in connection with the
creation of a life estate out of a fee simple; it seems inescapable with the
creation of a power in another to divest the fee simple.
Surely the Commissioner would contend that the creation of an estate
pur autre vie or a "section 2056 (b) (5) power" necessarily requires that the
entire interest be accepted before the acts of creation and transfer can take
place.72 If the Commissioner were to prevail in such an argument, the technique suggested by the second illustration would result in an intrafamily
taxpayers' nightmare instead of the panacea intended: "Parcel A" would be
includible in the father's estate,7

3

with no offsetting marital deduction.74

It

would be includible in the mother's estate at her death since she would

missioner, 216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954). But cf. Blair v. Commissioner, 200 U.S. 5 (1937).
In such case, gift tax liability would be imposed as if income payments were received by W,
or whenever S relinquished control and dominion over the property. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-

2(b) (1958).
65. Nathanson, Estate Planning with Disclaimers, 105 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1153 (1966).
66. See text accompanying infra notes 136-38, 207-10.
67. Cf. text following supra subheading Refusal To Accept.
68. See text accompanying infra notes 163, 164.
69. See text accompanying infra notes 166, 167.
70. See text accompanying supra note 39.
71. A partial disclaimer of successive interests should be distinguished from the disclaimer of a successive interest when such interest represents the entire interest bequeathed
to the disdlaimant. Such a total disclaimer of a partial interest in property seems dearly
valid. Cf. text following infra subheading Interests in a Testamentary Trust for discussion
of disclaimers of interests in trust.
72. Cf. Commissioners v. Vease's Estate, 314 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1963).

73.

CoDE §2033.

74. No interest "passes" from H to W within requirement of CODE §2056 (a).
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possess a power 75 that would meet the requirements of section 2041 (a) (2).
It would be included in S's and D's estate at their deaths (subject to a lower
valuation) .- In addition, the transfer by S and D of the general power to I V
7
would presumably result in gift tax liability. 7

Most of the state statutes simply provide for the right to disclaim "in
whole or in part."7 Minnesota, however, has incorporated language in its
statutes that might make the above "disclaimers" possible. 9
Timely Disclaimer
A judicially developed rule requires that disclaimer be made within a
"reasonable time" after receipt of the legacy,0 a "reasonable time" varying
from fourteen years in one case"' to four months in another.8 2 Courts have
tended to allow a longer period if no one has suffered by the delay.8 3 Other
factors that have been considered are the minority or incompetency of the
beneficiary, the lack of knowledge of the bequest, or other circumstances
that could affect the beneficiary's opportunity and ability to disclaim.
For example, in Bacon v. Barber,84 H died in 1923 leaving property to IV
for life (who died in 1931), then to D for life (who died in 1933), with
remainder to S (who was a minor at the death of H, attaining age 21 in
1926). The court held that the reasonable time began to run after the minor
attained his majority.
The court in Coleman v. Burns-5 held that a devisee's renunciation of
a life estate prior to termination of an existing life estate, and before right
to possession arose, was a renunciation within a reasonable time. Likewise, it
75. A general power of appointment is typically created, say, by H's bequeathing a
life estate to a legatee, e.g., W, coupled with a power to appoint the corpus of the property
by will or deed. It seems unusual to suppose that the owner of a remainder interest, e.g., S
or D, would "transfer" or, by a partial acceptance of the remainder subject to a partial
disclaimer of the general power, "disclaim" such a power.
76. CODE §2033.
77. S's and D's retained interest would not be susceptible of measurement on the basis
of generally accepted valuation principles, since W would have the power to divest them
of their ownership at any time. Therefore, the gift tax would be applicable to the entire
value of the property subject to the power transferred to IF. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1 (e)
(1958).
78. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §15b (1963).
79. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§501.211, 525.532(1)(b), (2) (Supp. 1966) (this statute is
reprinted infra in the Appendix). But see Note, 51 MINN. L. REv. 907, 921 nn.177, 178 and
accompanying text for a suggestion that in view of the tax motivation behind the Minnesota
statute, a valid disclaimer under the statute might not meet the more stringent test that
the Commissioner would apply. To be sure, use of the word "disclaimer" is not conclusive.
But if the refusal to accept property is valid under a reasonable state statute, which the
Minnesota legislation seems to be, the disclaimer should meet the test of CODE §2056 (d) (2).
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
80. See generally 6 PAGE §49.8; Lentz at 321.
81. Seifner v. Weller, 171 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1943).
82. In re Howe's Estate, 112 N.J. Eq. 17, 163 A. 234 (Prer. 1932).
83. E.g., Lehr v. Switzer, 213 Iowa 658, 239 N.W. 564 (1931) (3 years, 4 months held
reasonable).
84. 110 Vt. 280, 6 A.2d 9 (1939).
85. 103 N.H. 313, 171 A.2d 33 (1961).
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was held in Cumberland University v. Caldwel5 a that the entire period during
which the prior estate lasts is available to determine whether to disclaim.
Several states have passed statutes prescribing the time within which the
disclaimer must be made.87 These statutes must be studied with care, as the
time periods are crucial and usually less than the fifteen months permitted
by section 2056 (d) (2). Another significant variation is the time from which
the reasonable period should be measured. For example, in the case of
intestacy, Ohio provides for a period of sixty days after notice of hearing on
the inventory of intestate property; 8 West Virginia provides for two months
after the date of death of the intestate. 89 The variations may occur within the
same state, depending upon whether intestate property or property under a
will is involved, for example, West Virginia's two-month period runs from
the date on which the will is admitted to probate as compared with the date
of death in intestacy. 90
The Minnesota statute, which provides that the six-month period begins
to run with the event that causes the disclaimant to become "finally ascertained" as a beneficiary and his interest to become "indefeasibly fixed both in
quality and quantity," has been criticized as overly permissive in allowing
a long period during which a beneficiary may decide whether he needs the
interest. 91 It would seem, however, that this language simply codifies the
rationale of Coleman and Cumberland University and is not unreasonable
when the interest or the beneficiary is not certain or ascertained.
In any event, the requirements of Code section 2056 (d) (2) (A) that the
disclaimer be made before the date prescribed for filing of the estate tax
return should mark the outside limit within which a disclaimer must be
made in order to qualify. Arguably, it states the only time limitation.9"
Nevertheless, reliance on the fifteen-month period would seem to ignore the
importance of the state law requirement. 93
86. 203 Ala. 590, 84 So. 846 (1919). Accord, Seifner v. Weller, 171 S.W.2d 617 (Mo.

1943).
87. See infra note 147.
88. OHo REv. CoDE ANN. §2105.06.1 (Page Supp. 1966).
89. W. VA. CODE ANN. §42-4-3 (1966).
90. Id.
91. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§525.532(3), 501.211 (3) (Supp. 1966) contain the "finally ascertained" and "indefeasibly fixed both in quality and in quantity" language criticized in
Note, 51 MINN. L. Rxv. 931-38: "The justification for allowing disclaimers tax effect seems
to be that it is unjust to force a man to take something he does not want and then attach
tax liability when the disclaimant does not in fact obtain possession of, or any direct
benefit from, the property. However, the liberality of this statute allows a beneficiary
much more than the right to disclaim an interest. He has the benefit of waiting for a long
period to see whether he needs the interest before deciding whether to disclaim. Thus,
he has control over the property which warrants the imposition of a tax. Yet this statute allows him the economic security of having the interest at his disposal and also the tax
advantage of being able to eventually disclaim and pass the interest tax free to, in most

instances, the natural objects of his bounty." Id. at 938 (citation omitted).
92. It could be argued that Congress, in establishing a 15-month period, intended expressly to state what is "reasonable." But cf. infra note 94.

93. See supra note 7.
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Suppose, for example, that H dies on January 1, 1967, in a state that does
not have a disclaimer statute, leaving a bequest to S, which S disclaims
fourteen months after H's death. Is the disclaimer effective for purposes
of section 2056 (d) (2) if fourteen months is held unreasonable for state law
purposes? The answer must surely be "no" since the disclaimer is not
effective under local law. 94
Of course, it is unlikely that the Commissioner would attack a disclaimer
made within fifteen months unless a statute requires a shorter period or unless
the disclaimer has been attacked for some other reason (for example, by
creditors to satisfy claims) .5
Additional aspects of the time limitation are discussed in the section
concerning interests passing by nontestamentary transfers.
Disclaimer Without Consideration
For a disclaimer to be valid within the purposes of section 2056 (d) (2),
it must be made without consideration. 6 As stated in the Senate Finance
Committee Report: "[J]t cannot be made for the purpose of serving the
interests of a person who disclaims. For example, a disclaimer for the benefit
of a surviving spouse who promises to give or bequeath property to a child of
'' 7
the person who disclaims is not a disclaimer within the meaning of the bill."
Stating that the disclaimer "cannot be made for the purpose of serving
the interests" of a disclaimant is probably misleading. Many cases have held
94. Cf. 5 METNS §34.14, where it is stated in connection with the similar provision
in CODE §2055 (a): "Whether the 'reasonable time' rule of the regulations is intended to
apply where the state law fixes a 'shorter' period is not clear, but a negative answer is
indicated in the provision of the regulations that the refusal must be 'effective under local
law."'
95. See text accompanying infra note 102.
96. It should be clear that consideration is not only unnecessary but is evidence that,
instead of a disclaimer, there has been an acceptance and exchange for the consideration.
Occasionally, however, opinions contain language as follows: "A consideration is not essential to the validity of a disclaimer by a devisee of his interest." Commerce Trust Co. v.
Fast, 396 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Mo. 1965) (quoting from 96 C.J.S. Wills §1151) (1957).
If consideration is present, however, the exchange should not result in a gift tax liability
if the consideration is "adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth."
See CODE §2512 (b); cf. Estate of Sarah A. Bergan, 1 T.C. 543 (1943) for a case where the
Commissioner attacked a purported renunciation of a portion of an intestate share, contending that the decedent had made a "transfer," since she had accepted part and attempted
to renounce the balance. The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that decedent
had either to accept all or renounce all; nevertheless, it did hold that decedent had made
a "transfer," thus including the property in her gross estate. "Taking all the evidence into
consideration, we think it must be held that the decedent made a transfer to Mrs. Goggin
of the decedent's share . . .in excess of the $50,000 block of bonds. Otherwise, there would
have been no consideration for Mrs. Goggin's promise to support [decedent] for the remainder of [decedent's] life [and Mrs. Goggin's testimony had shown a binding contract]."
Id. at 544.
If the Commissioner had argued Bergan after Hardenbergh (see text accompanying
infra note 141), he would undoubtedly have prevailed simply by contending that an heir
cannot renounce an intestate share.

97.

SENATE FINANCE COMM.

REP. at 3116.
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that the motives for a disclaimer are usually immaterial 98 If this were not
true, virtually all disclaimers could be attacked for improper motive.
For example, in Isaac Harter, Jr.,99 H renounced his interest under W's
will, electing to receive his intestate share, which he then transferred to his
three children. The court held that W's estate was entitled to the estate tax
marital deduction for the interest passing to H in intestacy. That H's transfer
was consistent with W's presumed desires and that he was motivated to reduce
taxes were held to be immaterial motives.
In United States v. McCrackin,100 the court found that the taxpayer's
motive in disclaiming was to prevent the Government from satisfying a preexisting tax lien against his property; nevertheless, the court held the disclaimer valid under Ohio law.101 It further held that although taxpayer had
power under Ohio law to revoke the renunciation, 0 2 the court could not
compel him to do so.
Creditors constitute the other major source of attack of disclaimers on the
ground of improper motive. The majority view is that the disclaimer is valid,
notwithstanding the motive to defeat creditors, so long as there is no collusion with the remaindermen or other fraud. 03 Substantial inroads have been
made into this doctrine: Several states have statutes that would restrict the
right of disclaimer,104 and California courts have refused to uphold such a
discaimer. o5
98. See generally Annot. 93 A.L.R.2d 8, 64 (1964).
99. 59 T.C. 511 (1962).
100. 189 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ohio 1960).
101. Id. at 635 citing Ohio Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 41 Ohio L. Abs. 250, 57 N.E2d
717 (1943).
102. Id. at 637, citing Erman v. Erman, 101 Ohio App. 245, 136 N.E.2d 385 (1956).
103. See, e.g., Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922); Bradford v.
Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S.W. 502 (1908); cf. Commerce Trust Co. v. Fast, 396 S.W.2d
683 (Mo. 1965) (dictum); In re Krakoff's Estate, 87 Ohio App. Abs. 387, 180 Ohio Op. 2d
116, 179 N.E.2d 566 (P. Ct. Franklin Co. 1961) (dictum). See also Annot. 93 A.L.R2d
8, 64 (1964); Annot. 133 A.L.R. 1428 (1941).
104. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §525.532 (6) (Supp. 1966); Mo. REv. STAT. §474.490 (1959)
("renunciation... subject to the rights of creditors").
105. E.g., In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940). Ella Kalt died in
1932, leaving the residue of her estate to her sons, Earl and Stanley. Subsequent to her
death, judgment creditors attempted to attach Stanley's interest in the estate, and in 1936
Stanley filed a "renunciation," admittedly to defeat the collection of the judgments. The
court said: "(Wjhen a testator dies, the legatee obtains a power, in itself a limited right
of ownership [see Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. Rav. 1141 at 1159 (1938)],
to determine the ultimate disposition of the property regardless of acceptance on his part.
If he makes no renunciation, the full title will vest in him when he acquires possession and
control. If he chooses to renounce, he determines by that action that the title will pass
on to some other heir or legatee. This power is essentially analogous to a general power
of appointment under a will. It is well established that the donee of a general power of
appointment cannot exercise it in favor of some third person, other than a bona fide
purchaser for value, when the claim of his creditors would thereby be defeated.... The
principle that the exercise of a general power of appointment by a debtor may be a fraudulent conveyance as to his creditors dearly supports the rule we adopt in the present case
that a renunciation of a bequest by a legatee may likewise be a fraudulent conveyance."
Id. at 812, 108 P.2d at 403.
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Capacity and Consent To Disclaim
A question may arise whether the personal representative of an incapacitated person can disclaim.106 The court in In re Howe's Estate 07 held that
where a donee has had no opportunity to renounce, the right to renounce
"may be exercised on the donee's behalf by the donee's executor, administrator, or guardian." But in Andrykowski v. Theis,108 the court held that the
right to renounce is personal and dies with the legatee or devisee; the administrator or executor has no power to renounce.
In re Estate of Glenn'0 9 presents a case in which an administrator's disclaimer was permitted to stand, but under a qualification that might not
meet the "unqualified refusal" test of the tax law. The court, pursuant to
statutory authority, approved a renunciation, but added this language: "The
renunciation, however, shall not adversely affect any rights or defenses which
may be asserted to defeat any claim on behalf of the estate of the decedent.""10
If the Commissioner were to contend that such a qualification invalidated the
disclaimer, perhaps part of the disclaimed property could be saved for the
marital deduction by arguing that the disclaimer meets the requirements of
a partial disclaimer."'
A significant tax case in this area is Perkins v. Phinney." 2 H and W were
killed in an automobile accident, H dying immediately and W surviving for
three or four hours without regaining consciousness. H's will left one-third
of his estate to each of his two children and the remaining one-third to W.
Prior to the joint funeral, W's independent executrix, joined by W's devisees
and legatees, renounced on behalf of W. The court found that the renunciation was "fair, reasonable, and natural" and was "made immediately without
any intention of avoiding the payment of estate taxes. '" 1 3 The renunciation
was held to be authorized; thus the bequest from H to W was not includible
in W's gross estate.
The Minnesota legislation, rather than giving the personal representative
an absolute right to disclaim, subjects the right to a "best interests" standard."1
The question of fraud and undue influence was raised in Larson v.
Smith." 5 An eighty-four year old woman renounced her interest in her
brother's will, thereby causing the property to descend as intestate property
to the brother's widow. Five years later, the disclaimant was adjudged mentally incompetent. Her daughter was appointed guardian and instituted an
action alleging that the renunciation was procured by the fraud and undue
influence of the administrator of the testator's estate and the testator's widow.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See generally 6

115.

18 Wis. 2d 366, 118 N.W.2d 890 (1963).

PAGF §49.4.
112 N.J. Eq. 17, 163 A. 234 (Prer. 1932).
40 I1. App. 2d 182, 189 N.E.2d 3 (1963).
258 N.C. 351, 128 S.E.2d 408 (1962).
Id. at 353, 128 S.E.2d at 409.
Cf. text following supra subheading PartialDisclaimer.
61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. I]11,997, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1753 (W.D. Tex. 1961).
61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 111,997, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1754 (W.D. Tex. 1961).
MINN. STAT. ANN. §525.532(2) (Supp. 1966).
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The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the judgment of the trial court,
which held that the facts indicated that the renunciation was not the product
of undue influence and fraud. But the opinion added: "[A]n executor or
administrator... is in a position of trust and confidence toward a beneficiary
under the will and an action in which he participates and which deprives the
beneficiary of substantial rights without adequate consideration in favor of
a third party to whom the administrator is related or closely associated raises
a presumption that the transfer of rights is procured by undue influence.
The inference to be drawn from this presumption is sufficient proof of undue
influence without other affirmative evidence of the exercise of undue influence
unless the trial court can reasonably conclude that the evidence as a whole
negatives the presence of the undue influence in procuring the transfer." 106
Method of Evidencing Disclaimer
Absent a statute to the contrary, a disclaimer need not be in writing;
a verbal disclaimer, consistent with other conduct, has traditionally been
adequate. 11 Moreover, neither the language of section 2056 (d) nor the
Senate Finance Committee Report refers to the necessity of a writing. Nevertheless, the disclaiming party should always disclaim the interest in writing
and file it in the appropriate records. Unnecessary problems of proof are
otherwise virtually certain to arise.
It may be necessary to argue that an oral disclaimer, timely communicated
to the attorney, but reduced to writing beyond the permitted time period, is
valid. Such a contention was rejected, in Selig v. United States" s under the
similar disclaimer provision of section 2055(a).
The issue of oral disclaimer may also arise in an income tax context. 1 9
In FirstNational Bank of Portland,Executor,120 the taxpayer, who was trustee
and life beneficiary of a trust under his wife's will, orally disclaimed his
beneficial interest in 1933, confirming the disclaimer by a written instrument
in 1936. The instrument was subsequently held by a state court to be a
valid disclaimer of all rights to income from the estate. Accordingly, the
Board of Tax Appeals held that the trust income was not taxable as amounts
distributable to the taxpayer under section 162 of the Revenue Act of 1934.
Grant v. Commissioner,'2' however, held that a disclaimer may not operate
retroactively so as to relieve the beneficiary of a tax on the share of income
for prior years. Thus, it would seem difficult to argue successfully that the
116. Id. at 375, 118 N.W.2d at 895.
117. E.g., Coleman v. Bums, 103 N.H. 313, 171 A.2d 33 (1961) (writing not necessary

to renunciation of life estate in realty); Albany Hosp. v. Hanson, 214 N.Y. 435, 108 N.E.
812 (1915). See generally Annot. 93 A.L.R.2d 8, 71 (1964).
118. 73 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1947), aff'd per curiam, 166 F.2d 299 (3d Cir. 1948).
119. The income tax effect of disclaimers is beyond the scope of this article. See generally the discussion in Lentz at 322; Note, Disclaimers in Federal Taxation, 63 HAZY. L.
R v. 1047, 1051 (1950); see Rev. Rul. 64-62, 1964-1 Cum. BuL. 221.
120. 39 B.T.A. 828 (1939).
121. 174 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1949), affg 11 T.C. 178 (1948). See also Robert E. Cleary,

34 T.C. 728 (1960).
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income from date of death to the date of a written disclaimer should be taxed
to one other than the disclaimant, provided no earlier oral disclaimer had
been made.
Conceivably, a disclaimer could be shown solely on the basis of acts and
conduct. However, where such attempts have been made the beneficiary has
usually alleged acceptance.J

22

The taxpayer in charitable deduction cases has had difficulty proving a
disclaimer in absence of clear, unequivocal language. For example, in Seubert
v. Shaughnessy12a the life tenant intended to disclaim a power to invade
principal in order to qualify property for the charitable deduction. He filed
an affidavit, which stated he had "no intention of invading the principal of
decedent's estate for any purpose whatsoever." The court held the affidavit
was insufficient to save the deduction. In City National Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States,' 24 a bequest failed because of the beneficiary's death before the

bequest took effect, but within the time for filing of the estate tax return. As
a result, the residuary estate passed to qualified charities. Nevertheless, the
court refused the administrator's contention that death constituted a disclaimer; thus the estate did not get the charitable deduction. In Hight v.
United States,125 a bequest of the residuary estate to "such charitable, benevolent, religious, or educational institutions as my executors... may determine"
was held to be beyond the scope of the charitable deduction. The court
rejected the executor's contention that he had disclaimed the power by
expressly committing the property to qualifing charities; the executor's act
was held to be "an effort to change the nature of the legal interest described
by the testatrix in her will." The case was reversed, however, on the grounds
122. Examples of acts and conduct constituting a disclaimer are Cook v. Dove, 32 Ill.
2d 109, 203 N.E.2d 892 (1965) (legatees' (appointees') objecting to mother's (donee's)
estate tax return held refusal of property tendered in exercise of power of appointment);
In re Pendergrass' Will, 251 N.C. 737, 112 S.E.2d 562 (1960) (parties to "consent judgment"
(family settlement), estopped from taking under will which they agreed not to offer, but
required, nevertheless, to offer).
In the following cases, attempts to show disclaimer by acts and conduct were unsuccessful.
In re Moulton's Estate, 176 Cal. App. 2d 87, 1 Cal. Rptr. 407 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (no
disclaimer shown when beneficiaries recovered judgment for services rendered even though
will did not show that bequests were intended as compensation); In re Pellicer's Estate,
118 So. 2d 59 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1960) (act of legatee in filing petition for revocation of
probate of will did not constitute renunciation); In re Slawson's Estate, 41 So. 2d 324
(Fla. 1949) (letters from H to W's son, indicating a "probable intention" to renounce, corroborated by memoranda from W to son suggesting that H would likely renounce, held
insufficient evidence of H's renunciation); Parenteau v. Gaillardetz, 103 N.H. 92, 166 A.2d
112 (1960) (surviving owner of joint bank account held not to have disclaimed by changing
registration to the estate of the deceased coowner in order to pay debts of decedent); In re
Snell's Estate, 30 Misc. 2d 373, 223 N.Y.S.2d 395 (Sur. Ct. 1961) (legatee was given bequest
subject to his electing before age 21 to obtain an education. He timely commenced the
education and his subsequent interruption of the education did not constitute renunciation
of the legacy); In re Carpenter's Estate, 36 Misc. 2d 346, 232 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sur. Ct. 1962)
(affidavit filed by executor in probate proceeding to explain gift was not a renunciation).
123. 233 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1956).
124. 312 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963).
125. 151 F. Supp. 202 (D. Conn. 1957), rev'd, 256 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1958).
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that the term "benevolent" when coupled with "charitable" fell within the
126
charitable deduction provision.
Most state statutes provide expressly for the method of evidencing a disclaimer.127 But even a statute may not clarify whether the statutory method
is exclusive. For example, the Ohio statute refers only to renunciations of
an interest received in intestate succession. 28 The purpose of the statute was
undoubtedly to give legislative approval to an heir's right to renounce. Certainly it would be unreasonable to assume that beneficiaries under a will
cannot disclaim since they are not included in the statute. Nevertheless, such
patchwork legislation does raise legitimate questions: Does the required procedure, that is, "written statement . . . within 60 days after notice of the
hearing on inventory," also apply to renunciations of interests under a will?
It is doubtful that a court would ignore such a statute in judging a purported
renunciation.
Revocation of Valid Disclaimer
There should be no question that a right once waived cannot be reclaimed. 2 9 For purposes of the "complete and unqualified refusal" requirement was attempting to satisfy a tax lien by attaching "renounced" property,
indicate where no one has undergone a change of position, it is sometimes
possible to withdraw a renunciation.' 3' Most of the cases permitting withdrawal have involved charitable beneficiaries.13
If it could be shown that the state law provided for withdrawal of a
renunciation, there would seem to be a danger that a disclaimer in such a
state could not qualify for purposes of section 2056 (d) (2). One of the
questions raised in United States v. McCrackin,:33 a case where the Government was attempting to satisfy a tax lien by attaching "renounced" property,
was whether the court could order the taxpayer to withdraw his renunciation.
The court held that, although taxpayer could revoke his renunciation under
Ohio law (citing Erman v. Erman,"34 it was not within the court's jurisdiction to compel taxpayer to renounce.
It does not seem likely that the Commissioner would accept the defeat
in McCrackin without attempting to use it to his advantage-say, for
example, to show that a section 2056 (d) (2) disclaimer failed to meet the
requirement of a "complete and unqualified refusal to accept." An even
126. 256 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1958).
127. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.§525.532 (Supp. 1966).
128. Omo REv. CODE ANN. §2105.06.1 (Page Supp. 1966).
129. Cf., e.g., Johnson v .Tuttle, 108 Vt. 291, 187 A. 515 (1936).
130. "A disclaimer . . . is a complete and unqualified refusal to accept some or all of
the rights to which one is entitled." Senate Finance Comm. Rep. at 3116.
131. Cf. I A. ScoTw, TRUSTS §36.1 (2d ed. 1956, Supp. 1962) [hereinafter cited as ScoT].
132. See, e.g., In re Angers Will, 33 Misc. 2d 122, 225 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sur. Ct. 1962);

In re Copeland's Estate, 123 Vt. 32, 179 A.2d 475 (1962) (withdrawal permitted even
though right of beneficiary named in will was prejudiced thereby).
133. 189 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ohio 1960).
134. 101 Ohio App. 245, 136 N.E2d 385 (1956).
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stronger contention under such a law would be that the property "passing"
to the surviving spouse failed to qualify because it is a nonqualifying terminable interest 35 - disqualified because of the power remaining in the disclaimant to revoke the disclaimer.
PART

II.

TYPES OF INTERESTS SUBJECT TO DISCLAIMERS; THE EFFECTS OF
DISCLAIMING SUCH INTERESTS

The statute does not provide specifically for the types of interests that
may be disclaimed. Section 2056 (d) (2) refers only to an "interest," the
reference throughout section 2056 being to an "interest in property." Athough
the words "interest in property" will bear various meanings, 136 the congressional purpose of the statute seems to call for a broad interpretation. The
Senate Finance Committee Report states: "[Plroperty passing to a surviving
spouse by way of a disclaimer should be treated no differently than where the
property passes directly to the surviving spouse." 137 Thus, it seems fair to
conclude that any "interest in property" that, either alone or in conjunction
with other interests, would qualify for the estate tax marital deduction if
it passed directly to the surviving spouse, should also qualify as an "interest"
capable of being disclaimed for purposes of section 2056 (d) (2).138
Interests Passing by Testamentary Transfers and Intestate Succession
(a). Interests Passing by Intestate Succession or Otherwise by Operation
of Law
No court that has considered the matter recognizes a common law right
of an heir to disclaim an inherited interest.1 9 As mentioned earlier, 140 the
significance of such a right was first appreciated because of the holding in
Hardenbergh v. Commissioner.14 1 The facts of Hardenbergh were, briefly,
as follows: H died intestate on April 2, 1944. Under Minnesota law his surviving wife, W, their daughter, D, and his son by a former marriage, S,were
entitled to his net estate (consisting at date of death of realty and personalty)
- one-third to each. W and D were independently wealthy, so shortly before
his death H had asked his attorney to draft a will, leaving virtually all of his
estate to S. The will was prepared for execution on Saturday, April 1, but
135. CODE §2056 (b) (1); see 1 CASNER at 832-36.
136. "Doubtless, the same group of legal relations may be regarded as a property interest for one purpose and not for another. And it may be said at the outset that, until
we know the purpose for which the classification 'interest in property' is to be applied, it
is futile to attempt to decide whether a given situation presents such an interest." L. SIMES
& A. SMITH, FUTURE INTER sIS §942 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as SiMES & SMrrH].
137. SENATE FINANCE COMM. REP. at 3114.
138. Cf. text following infra subheading (e). Interests of Donee of a Power of Appointment Created by Testamentary Instrument for additional discussion of disclaimers of power
of appointment.
139. See PAGE §49.1.
140. See text accompanying supra note 33 (no opportunity to refuse to accept).
141. 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
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because of the decedent's illness, it was decided to wait until Monday, April 3.
Decedent died on Sunday without executing the will. In order to carry out
decedent's intention, W and D filed a disclaimer of their interests on September 20, 1944. The estate was then distributed to S pursuant to court order.
The Commissioner determined that W and D had each made a gift to S
of one-third of the net estate, and his action was sustained by the Tax Court.
Taxpayers appealed on grounds that the Minnesota probate court was "invested with jurisdiction to determine decedent's heirs and to adjudicate the
taxpayer's right to renounce," and that the court's decree - not the act of
taxpayers - was the source of S's title to the property.
In affirming the decision of the Tax Court, the court said: "The controlling fact here is that title to an interest in decedent's estate vested in the
taxpayers by operation of law which neither had the power to prevent....
The source of the rights acquired by [5] was not the decree of the Probate
Court, but the affirmative acts of taxpayers in relinquishing the shares of the
estate which Minnesota law vested in them."142
The Hardenbergh decision has been criticized as a formalistic distinction
justified only in the feudal emphasis upon seisin; 143 as a distinction that,
although perhaps supportable in the local law of decedents' estates, should
not be controlling on federal tax questions; 144 and on constitutional
grounds.145 Nevertheless, the distinction seems firmly entrenched. The extent
to which it is followed is shown in William L. Maxwell,' 46 in which H
disclaimed all interests passing to him under W's will (which the court
recognized as a valid disclaimer); but, recognizing that the disclaimed
interest would thereby pass by intestate succession, he also disclaimed his
intestate share in the same instrument. The court held that H's disclaimer
of the intestate share failed to prevent passage of title; thus, H was held to
have made a taxable gift.
Minnesota law was at issue in Hardenbergh, so it is not surprising that
Minnesota has passed the most comprehensive disclaimer legislation to date.
47
Unfortunately, the "trap" of intestate interests still exists in too many states'
Thus, the decedent who relies upon the law of intestate succession as a

142. 198 F.2d at 66.
14a. 'Westfall, Estate Planning and the Widow's Election, 71 HARv.L. RLv. 1269, 1288-

89 (1958).
144. Boger, Taxation of Renunciations of Interests in Decedents' Estates Under the
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 2 DraIn L.J. 5, 7 (1951).
145. Roehner & Roehner, Renunciation as Taxable Gift-An Unconstitutional Federal
Tax Decision, 8 TAx L. REv. 289 (1953).

146. 17 T.C. 1589 (1952).
147. See the following state statutes that authorize an heir to disclaim or renounce
interests passing by intestacy: CoLo. RLv. STAT. ANN. §153-5-43 (1963); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3,
§§15b, 15c, 15d (1963); IND. ANN. STAT. §6-604 (1953); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 977 (West
1952); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§501.211, 525-532 (Supp. 1966); Mo. REv. STAT. §474.490 (1959);
N.Y. Dzcn. Esr. LAW §87a (McKinney 1949); N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-10 (Supp. 1965); Omo
Rv. CoDE ANN. §2105.06.1 (Page Supp. 1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §301.3 (Purdon Supp.
1966); R.I. GEN LAws ANN. §§34-5-1 to 34-5-12 (1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. §42-4-3 (1966);
Wis. STAT. §237.01 (1961).
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"general will" has created a situation that will have unfortunate tax conse148
quences if a "disclaimer" is attempted.

Suppose a particular state gives an heir the right to disclaim. An
important question still remains. Will the disclaimed interest thereby pass
to the surviving spouse and qualify for the marital deduction? Stated differently: it seems clear that the disclaimant cannot direct that the disclaimed
interest pass to the surviving spouse without the transfer having the effect of
an "acceptance and release. 149 Furthermore, the marital deduction will not
be increased if the otherwise valid disclaimer does not pass to W in such
form or otherwise affect property passing to W in such a way as to qualify
1 50
additional property for the deduction.

To illustrate, assume that H is survived by W and two children, S and D,
only one of whom, S,is 21 years of age and competent to disclaim. Assume
further that the net distributable estate before estate taxes is worth 300,000
dollars. A typical statute of descent and distribution 5 1 would give W a onethird interest in the personalty and realty and divide the balance among the
children, as follows:

No Disclaimer

S Disclaims All

W (one-third)
$100,000
Children (balance in equal shares) :
S
100,000
D
100,000

$100,000

$300,000

$300,000

-0200,000

As a result, W gets only one-third, and the effect of S's disclaimer would
be to augment not the property passing to W but the property passing to D.
This undesirable result will obtain in any case where more than one child
(or children of a deceased child) survives and when less than all disclaim.
The problem is important because it is not unlikely that one of the children
or children of a deceased child will be a minor.
148. Much has been written on Hardenbergh and the gift tax problems it presents.
In addition to articles cited elsewhere in this article, see Arenson, 1964 Legislation Affecting
Law of Trusts and Estates: Renunciation of Intestate Share, 11 N.Y.L.F. 211, 222-23 (1965);
Black, The Effect of Renunciations and Compromises on Death and Gift Taxes, 3 VAND L.
RiEv. 241 (1950); Bowe, How To Provide for a Widow's Disclaimer Without Risking Gift Tax,
8 J. TAXATION 68 (1958); Dobbs, Renunciations and Disclaimers-Boon or Bane?, 50
A.B.A.J. 590 (1964); Harmsen, Careful Handling of Family Allowances and Renunciations
Can Save Taxes, 14 J.TAXATION 50 (1961); Kay, Renunciations, Disclaimers and Releases, 35
TAxES 767 (1957); Lauritzen, Only God Can Make an Heir, 48 Nw. U.L. R~v. 568 (1953);
Smith, Renunciations and Disclaimers, 96 TRUSTS & ESTATES 744 (1957); Comment, Effective
Renunciation of a Succession in Louisiana, 26 TUL. L. REv. 81 (1951); 31 TEXAS L. REv. 599
(1953); 5

VAND.

L. REv. 852 (1952).

149. Cf. Commissioner v. Vease's Estate, 314 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1963); text following
supra subheading Refusal To Accept.
150. CODE §2056. See generally 1 CASNER 824-74.
151. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 190 §§1,2,3 (1955); cf. I CASNERX 24-28.
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Some states, such as Florida, have intestate statutes providing that the
surviving spouse shall take the same as if he or she were one of the children. 1 2
Under such a statute, an effective disclaimer by a child would augment the
amount passing to the surviving spouse by reducing the number taking as
children. Using the same facts as above, a disclaimer in Florida would
produce the following result:

W (child's part)
Children:
S
D

No Disclaimer

S Disclaims All

$100,000

$150,000

100,000
100,000

-0150,000

$300,000

$300,000

The Florida statute provides some planning flexibility not possible in
the typical state. Although the minor daughter's share is also augmented, S's
disclaimer successfully shifts 50,000 dollars to W; there is no gift tax in either
case, 153 and the 50,000 dollars additional to W qualifies under section
2056 (d) (2) to augment the marital deduction. It is not unlikely that a taxpayer in S's position might want to shift inherited wealth in such a manner.
(b).

Interests Passing Under a Will-Including Interests Passing Under
a Testamentary Trust

Devises and Bequests. The will draftsman should foresee the possible
advantages of disclaimers and should provide expressly for the right to disclaim and for the alternate disposition of any disclaimed property. 154 Absent
such a provision, however, it is well settled that interests under a will can
usually be disclaimed, if not contrary to testator's intent.' 55
Although the courts are unanimous in recognizing disclaimers of interests
passing by will, they have not agreed upon the theory underlying the condition of the title during the period from testator's death to date of the disclaimer. One view compares the gift to an offer that does not become a
binding obligation until accepted. Upon acceptance, the title is treated as
relating back to the date of death; upon renunciation, the gift is treated as
void ab initio.56 The other view treats the title as having vested subject to
being divested by the renunciation, in which case the renunciation is treated
as relating back to the date of death. 57 Since the final result is the same
152. FLA.
153.

STAT.

§731.23 (1) (1967).

See supra note 58.

154. See, e.g., Estate of Devlin, 46 Misc. 2d 399, 259 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sur. Ct. 1964)
(testatrix provided for alternate gift to charity in case of renunciation).
155. Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933).
See generally PAGE §49.2; Ekman at 530; Frankel at 2198.
156. E.g., Albany Hosp. v. Hanson, 214 N.Y. 435, 108 N.E. 812 (1915); Perkins v.
Isley, 224 N.C. 793, 32 S.E.2d 588 (1945); see PAGE §49.4.
157. E.g., Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922); see PAGE §49.4;
cf. Smith, Renunciations and Disclaimers,96 TRusrs 8c EsTATES 744 (1957).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1968], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

under either theory, the distinction might be regarded as irrelevant if it were
not for the vesting language in Hardenbergh: After recognizing the right of
a legatee or devisee to renounce, citing Brown v. Routzahn 158 as authority,
the court distinguished Routzahn since "those so entitled by law have no
power to prevent the vesting of title in themselves .... The controlling fact
. . . is that title . . .vested . . . by operation of law which neither had the

power to prevent".159 This language has caused several writers to suggest that
a devisee might not have the right to renounce if the controlling state law
vests title in the devisee immediately upon death.1 60 This uncertainty may
partly explain why states such as Minnesota have given a specific right of
disclaimer to devisees and legatees as well as to intestate takers. 61
The effect of a disclaimer of an interest under a will often depends upon
whether the interest is specifically bequeathed or is part of the residual estate.
(1). Specific Gift. Assume that H makes a specific pecuniary bequest to
each of his children, S and D (both of whom are 21 and competent), the
residual estate to be divided into a "Marital Deduction Trust"1

62

for W

and a trust for H's grandchildren. Assume further that because of nonprobate
property includible in H's gross estate but not qualified for the marital deduction, W's trust is significantly lower than the desired maximum marital
deduction. These facts suggest the opportunity for S and D to consider
disclaiming all or part of their bequests. First, however, each must determine
with certainty that the disclaimed interest will pass as desired.
The cardinal rule is, of course, that testator's intention controls the devolution of disclaimed property. 63 Very often, however, the will is silent as to
the passing of disclaimed devises or legacies. In such case, the renounced
158.

63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933).

159.

Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63, 66 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344

U.S. 836 (1952).
160. E.g., Bowe, How To Provide for a Widow's Disclaimer Without Risking Gift Tax,
8 J. TAXATION 68, 69 (1958). But see Frankel at 2210 for a discussion suggesting that the
"archaic distinction between 'vested' and 'non-vested' property rights for renunciation
purposes" may have been abolished due to the change from the proposed regulations to
the final Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1(c) (1958). Mr. Frankel points out that the proposed
regulations contained the following: "The renunciation of a vested property interest, such
as the interest of an heir or next-of-kin, or devisee in whom title immediately vests
[emphasis added] upon a decedent's death under local law, constitutes a gift to those
persons who receive the property interest by means of the renunciation. On the other hand
the renunciation of a gift, bequest, or inheritance, if under local law title does not immediately vest, [emphasis added] is not a gift if the renunciation is complete, and is made
within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the interest." Proposed Treas.
Reg. §25.2511-1 (c), 22 Fed. Reg. 53 (1957). He then emphasizes the significant fact that
in the final regulations the "vested" language is omitted entirely. Mr. Frankel concludes:
"Considered in context, the new section thus perhaps indicates an abandonment of the
rigid and unrealistic distinction made by the Hardenbergh and Maxwell cases." Frankel at
2212.
161.

Cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. §525.532 (1) (a) (Supp. 1966).

162. Reference to a "Marital Deduction Trust" in this article means a trust for benefit
of W that meets all the requirements of CODE §2056 (b) (5). See generally 1 CASNER at 839-56.
163. In re Estate of Loranz, 256 Iowa 818, 128 N.W.2d 224 (1964).
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legacy passes under the residuary clause, if there is one. 64 Assuming then that
S's and D's disclaimed specific bequests pass by the residuary clause to the
trusts for W and for the grandchildren, the marital deduction is increased,
and property passes to the grandchildrens' trust without any gift taxes payable by S and D since the Code's disclaimer provision treats the property as
having passed directly from H.165
(2). Residuary Gift. Suppose that instead of the above disposition, H
makes a few specific bequests to collateral relatives, but disposes of most of
his estate by means of a clause that divides the residual estate into three parts
- one-half being in a "Marital Deduction Trust" for benefit of W, one-quarter
being in a trust for benefit of the grandchildren, and the remaining onequarter passing outright to D and S in equal shares. Again, assume that as a
result of nonprobate transfers, there is an opportunity to qualify additional
property for the estate tax marital deduction.
This residuary gift to D and S forecloses the possibility of augmenting the
"Marital Deduction Trust" because the disclaimed portion of a residuary
bequest does not remain in the residue to be divided among the nondisclaiming residual legatees.166 Rather, the disclaimed portion passes under the controlling statute of descent and distribution.167 Nevertheless, the result of a
disclaimer may be desirable because of the devolution of intestate property
under the typical statute of descent and distribution, as illustrated by the
following:
PROPERTY PASSING BY INTESTACY:

Without Any
Disclaimer

S and D Each Disclaim Residual
Shares Worth $45,000

W (one-third)
-0Children (balance in equal shares):
S
-0D
-0-

$30,000
30,000
30,000
$90,000

Thus, by disclaiming their residual gifts, S and D are able to shift property
to W without gift tax liability26s and yet achieve an augmentation of the
property qualifying for the estate tax marital deduction.
Many times W will have the right to renounce her rights under a will in
order to take a statutory dower share. 69 When such an election is contem164. Id.
165. CODE § §2056(d) (2), (e) (1).
166. E.g., Lehr v. Switzer, 213 Iowa 658, 239 N.W. 564 (1931).
167. Id.
168. Cf. supra note 58 concerning gift tax question. See text accompanying supra notes
151-53 for differences in result under a statute such as FLA. STAT. §731.23 (1) (1967).
169. A full discussion of the widow's election is beyond the scope of this article. See
generally 1 CAsmm 57-67; Brawerman, How To Draft a Will with the Widow's Election,
U. So. CAL. 1956 TAx INSr. 359 (1956); Kaufman & Shapiro, Incipient Tax Benefits in
in Widow's Election Wills: the Vardell and Gregory Cases, 41 TAXEs 553 (1963); Westfall,
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plated, it is important to determine whether the dower interest will be disqualified for the marital deduction as a terminable interest.17 0 In Florida,
although it seems that W's dower interest should qualify for the estate tax
marital deduction, it has been suggested that the interest may be terminable. "
Interests in a Testamentary Trust. The right of a devisee or legatee to

disclaim an interest under a will generally extend to the beneficiary of a trust
established under the terms of the will."'2 But a spendthrift provision in the

trust may limit this right.
The majority view, adopted by the American Law Institute, is that the
interest subject to the spendthrift provision may be disclaimed. 1'7 3 California,
nevertheless, seems committed to the contrary view, as shown by In re Nicely's
Estate."4 A significant fact in the case was that the renounced interest would
have passed to the beneficiary by intestacy. The court said: "Under the rule
sought here all such trust restrictions could be wiped out by the simple
sleight-of-hand of renunciation followed by a retrieval according to the laws
of intestate succession."17.5

If the testator creates successive interests, as in the typical testamentary
trust, it is essential to provide for alternative disposition in the event of a
disclaimer. Otherwise, serious construction questions may arise.17 6 The
following provision should obviate most problems when a prior interest is
disclaimed: "In the event that a beneficiary hereunder disclaims or renounces
the interest limited in his favor, succeeding interests shall take effect as though
such beneficiary had died on the date of the disclaimer or renunciation."'7
If no alternative provision is made, a court must attempt to ascertain the
intention of the testator. Since the intent is usually not clear, it will probably

Estate Planning and the Widow's Election, 71 HARV. L. RaV. 1269 (1958); Wren, The
Widow's Election, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATEs 13, 108 (1961).
170.

See generally 1 CASNER at 58;

STE'HENS &

MAxFrv.

at 200, 219-20.

171.

See Altman, Florida Dower-Does It Qualify for the Marital Deduction?, 22 U.
MIAM L. REy. 686 (1968), where the author concludes that Florida dower does not qualify
for the estate tax marital deduction, based primarily upon the rationale of Jackson v.
United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964); cf. FLA. STAT. §731.34 (1967).
172. See 1 ScoTr §36.1.
173. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §36 (1959). Accord, Commerce Trust Co. v.
Fast, 396 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1965). See generally E. GRISWOLD, SPENDTmUr

TRUSTS §524, at

603 (2d ed. 1947).
174. 235 Cal. App. 2d 174, 44 Cal. Rptr. 804 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
175. Id. 181, 44 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue has also utilized the spendthrift argument. Before Pennsylvania amended its law
expressly to permit the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust to disclaim in favor of a remainderman, the Commissioner contended in Estate of James M. Schoonmaker, Jr., 6 T.C. 404 (1946)
that a wife's purported disclaimer of the principal of a "spendthrift trust," of which she was
also life tenant, was "void and ineffective . . . under the laws of the Commonwealth ..
"
and therefore the charitable deduction should be denied. The court, however, rejected the
argument since the wife by her disclaimer did not undertake to assign or dispose of the
income of the trust, but merely gave up her right to any payments out of the principal.
176. See generally 1 CASNER at 555.
177.

1 CASNER at 566.
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be necessary to resort to constructional rules such as the doctrine of acceleration of remainders. 78 The doctrine has been stated in Wilmington Trust Go.
79
v. Carpenter1
as follows: "[U]pon the premature termination of a prior life
right to the income from a trust fund, the rights of the succeeding beneficiaries
will be accelerated unless contrary to the intent of the settlor of the trust.
...
[The] rule usually applies if the possession and enjoyment of the fund by
other beneficiaries is merely postponed for the benefit of a life taker of the
income." 80
The doctrine was recently applied by the Missouri supreme court in
Commerce Trust Go. v. Fast:'- H's will established a trust, the income of
which was payable to three of his children and to a daughterD, but only if
she was unmarried. At death of W (which occurred about ten months after
H's death), three-fourths of the trust was distributable to the three children,
the remaining one-fourth to be held in trust with income to D so long as
she remained "single and unmarried." Upon D's death, the trust was to be
distributed equally to the other three children. D brought suit on grounds
of lack of testamentary capacity, but, in consideration of a "Family Settlement
Agreement," withdrew the action and renounced all her interests under the
will. The court held that D's renunciation accelerated the succeeding interests. The following contentions of the guardian ad litem for the minor
grandchildren were rejected: (1) that the renunciation was invalid because it
was made in consideration of a plan for D to receive substantial property; (2)
that the contingent remainders were defeated contrary to express provisions of
the will; (3) that the adult beneficiaries had no power to agree to terminate
and thereby destroy appellants' contingent remainders; and (4) that, being
a spendthrift trust, it could not be terminated by agreement. Acceleration
seems properly applied if there was actually a valid renunciation. In view
of the convincing evidence that D received valuable consideration for her
actions, however, it is difficult to conclude that the renunciation was valid.
It appears, instead, that there was an agreement between the life tenant and
remaindermen to terminate the spendthrift trust- an action that dearly is not
permissible.
In re Borsch's Estate'8 2 exemplifies the usual attitude of the court when
178. See, for a discussion of the doctrine of acceleration of remainders, 5 AmmRcCAN
PROPERTY §§21.41-.46 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 RESTATYEmNT OF PROPERTY §§231-35
(1936); 2 SIMEmS & SmrrH §§791-804; Simes, Acceleration of Future Interests, 41 YALE LJ.

Ltw or

659 (1932); Note, Future Interests -Acceleration of Remainders upon Election of Surviving

Spouse To Take Intestate Share, 25 N.Y.U.L. Rrv. 130 (1950). Of course, the doctrine will
not always be applied. A major determinant is whether the remainder is indefeasibly

vested, vested subject to divestment, vested subject to open, or contingent. If vested, the
remainder is almost always accelerated but, if contingent, it is much more infrequently accelerated. See, e.g., 5 AMERCAN LAw Or PROPERTY §21.43 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). Furthermore, there is always the possibility that the life estate will be sequestered to compensate a
"disappointed legatee," one who has suffered loss by a disclaiming widow's claim of a
statutory share. See, e.g., Sellick v. Sellick, 207 Mich. 194, 173 N.W. 609 (1919).
179. 31 Del. Ch. 411, 75 A.2d at 815 (1950).

180. Id. at 421, 75 A.2d at 820.
181. 396 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1965).
182. 362 Pa. 581, 67 A.2d 119 (1949).
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an income beneficiary of a spendthrift trust attempts, after acceptance, to
renounce in order to terminate the trust and vest title in the remainderman.
83
The court said:
Spendthrift
for the donee,
vidual right of
termination by

trusts are sustained not because of the law's concern
but because the testator or donor possessed an indiproperty in the execution of the trust. To permit a
agreement or release would be an invasion of the

donor's property right.... It is a subterfuge, thinly veiled, to permit

a life tenant under a spendthrift clause to release and disclaim her
interest, thus accelerating the remainder, and then to permit the
remainderman to terminate the trust. This is allowing, by indirection,
that which this Court has consistently forbidden to be done directly.
(c). Interests Passing by the Exercise or Nonexercise of a Testamentary
Power of Appointment
It seems undisputed that the appointee of property pursuant to an
exercised power of appointment can disclaim the interest appointed184 Likewise, a taker in default of a valid exercise can disclaim if the property passes
pursuant to a gift-over provision in the will.185 Nevertheless, Commissioner v.
Cardeza's Estate,8 6 a case that considered the effect of a disclaimer of appointed property, suggests a possible problem that should not be overlooked.
The court presented the issue as follows: "T, a testator ... gives a life estate
to A with a testamentary power of appointment in A ... with a gift over in

default of appointment. T dies. Then A dies leaving a will in which he exercises the power by appointing [to] B. B, however, renounces. What happens
to the property which is the subject matter of the power?" The court held
that the predominant view and the law in Pennsylvania is that "a legacy in
default of appointment vests in the legatee on the testator's death, subject to
18 7
be[ing] divested by the exercise of the power."'
Perhaps the court used vested in a nontechnical sense. Cardeza's Estate
does predate Hardenbergh. In any event, state law that vests property in a
taker-in-default, subject to a power in another to divest the property, might
invite the kind of attack that has been feared in the case of state law that
vests realty in the devisee at testator's death. 88

183. Id. at 586, 589, 67 A.2d at 121, 123. See also Matthews Estate, 28 Pa. D. & C.2d
416 (1963).
184. E.g., Second Bank-State St. Trust Co. v. Yale Univ. Alumni Fund, 338 Mass. 520,
156 N.E.2d 57 (1959). Most of the cases have been primarily concerned with the incidence
of federal and state death taxes. State inheritance tax cases, e.g., are: Cook v. Dove, 32 Iln.
2d 109, 203 N.E.2d 892 (1965); In re Lansing's Estate, 182 N.Y. 238, 74 N.E. 882 (1905).
Federal estate tax cases, e.g., which have been concerned with whether a "pre-1942" power
has been exercised are: Wilson v. Kraemer, 190 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1951); Estate of Sarah v.
Moran, 16 T.C. 814 (1951).
185. See text accompanying supra note 155.
186. 173 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1949).
187. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
188. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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(d). Interests Passing by Succession to a Disclaimed Testamentary Interest
The Minnesota statute specifically provides for the right to disclaim an
interest passing as a result of a disclaimer by will, intestate succession, through
the exercise or nonexercise of a testamentary power of appointment, or by
renunciation and election to take against a will.189 Such a provision seems
unnecessary in a comprehensive statute. But it does underscore the importance of tracing the ultimate effect of a disclaimer to see. if another disclaimer
will be necessitated thereby.
(e). Interests of Donee of a Power of Appointment Created by Testamentary
Instrument
A. prospective disclaimant of a power of appointment should rely only
upon statutory authority;1 90 a soundly-reasoned precedent supporting such a
right to disclaim has not been found. Some courts and commentators have
assumed -indeed, courts have held - that a donee of a power can disclaim.
Nevertheless, the existence of statutory authority may be crucial, and there
does not seem to be a satisfactory primary authority on which to rely.
Imprecise terminology has created much of the confusion. There is a
tendency to use release and disclaimer interchangeably, to confuse the donee
of a power with the appointee of appointed property, or to confuse the donee
with the devisee or legatee under a will. Additional problems are raised
because of the different kinds of powers, for example, general, special, special
coupled with a trust.
The most persuasive authority for the proposition that "all powers of
appointment may be renounced or disclaimed" is found in Professors Simes'
and Smith's treatises: 191 "But, however we may classify a renunciation or
disclaimer, it is dear that it can operate to extinguish or prevent the existence
of a power of appointment."' 92 As authority for this statement, the authors
cite In re Finucane's Will,193 a case that clearly holds that the donee of a
MINN. STAT. ANN. §525.532(1) ((a)) (Supp. 1966).
190. Of the disclaimer statutes cited supra note 147, some authorize the donee of a
power of appointment to disclaim, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§501211, 525.532 (Supp. 1966);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §301.3 (Purdon Supp. 1966). In addition, there are statutes that
authorize disclaimers by the donee of a power, although not authorizing an heir to disclaim, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 204, §§27-34 (1958); VA. CoDE ANN. §55-278 (1959).
191. SuAs & SMITH §1061; L. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FTrruR INTERm 179
(2d ed. 1966). In fact, the "black-letter law" in the Handbook is the quoted material in the

189.

sentence footnoted.
192. SIMES & SMITH §1061.
193. 199 Misc. 1069, 100 N.YS.2d 1005 (Sur. Ct. 1950). The other authority cited in
Siasas & SMrrH is McLaughlin v. Industrial Trust, 28 Del. Ch. 275, 42 A.2d 12 (1945). Close
consideration of McLaughlin reveals that the court found it unnecessary to determine the
questions of whether an extinguishment of the power had occurred and whether such an
extinguishment was analogous in principle to the right of a devisee to disclaim a gift. See,
in particular, 28 Del. Ch. 280, 42 A.2d at 15. The bill was dismissed on other grounds, although the court recognized, as an apparent afterthought, that even if the power had been
extinguished, the effect would be that the property would pass to the heirs at law of
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special power of appointment can renounce. The case seems to be question94
able precedent, however, because the authorities relied upon by the court
in that case do not support the decision; the cited cases were concerned with
whether the appointee of an attempted exercise of a power could renounce.
The discussion in the treatise continues: "This [that a disclaimer can
operate to prevent the existence of a power of appointment] is true, even
though the power be in trust. For, just as a trustee may disclaim the trust
if he acts within a reasonable time,195 so it would seem that the donee of a
power in trust may disclaim the power."' 196 It seems questionable whether the
trustee analogy supports the conclusion. For "If the trustee disclaims, the
effect of the disclaimer is to pass the title back to the transferor or his estate
and retroactively to free the trustee of any liability as trustee to the benficiary
or as holder of the title to the trust property to any one. The trust, however,
does not fail."' 97 The Restatement also states: "A trustee cannot accept a
trust in part and disclaim in part."'19 8 In other words, although the Restatement is concerned that a trustee not be forced to serve against his wishes, it
clearly recognizes that the trust will not fail. Another trustee will be appointed
to carry out the wishes of the settlor of the trust. The proffered powers continue; the only alteration is that a different trustee will be appointed.
In the case of Ewing v. Rountree,'99 the main issue was whether the
decedent-donee possessed, at her death, a power of appointment not limited
by an ascertainable standard of support and maintenance. In order to avoid
a constitutional question, the court tried to show that the decedent had the
power to disclaim under section 2041 (a) (2) and added the following
comment: "There is no serious doubt that the donee of a power can renounce
it under the law of Tennessee." 20 0 An analysis of the cases cited by the court,
however, reveals that the issue in each case was not the right of a donee of
2 1
a power to disclaim, but was the right of a devisee or legatee. 0
Probably the best discussion of the right to surrender, release, or renounce
a power of appointment is found in Merrill v. Lynch. 20 2 The court recognized
the "settled law that a person may renounce a bequest or devise and refuse
to accept it" and continued by stating: "Likewise, in the case of general
beneficial powers, no statute says that they must be exercised, and no statute
testatrix (rather than the petitioning life tenant) since the will did not contain a provision
for a gift-over in default of appointment.
194. The court cites Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U.S. 153 (1935); Commissioner v. Cardeza's Estate, 173 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1949).
195. SiMas & SMITH §1061 citing RESTATEMENT oF TRUSTS §102 (1935).
196. SIMES &SMITH §1061.
197.
198.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

§ 102,

comment g (1959).
§102 (1959).

199. 228 F. Supp. 137 (M.D. Tenn. 1964), af'd, 346 F.2d 471 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 918 (1965).
200. 228 F. Supp. at 143.
201. The court cited McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn. App. 434, 134 S.W.2d
197 (1939); In re Hodge's Estate, 20 Tenn. App. 411, 99 S.W.2d 561 (1936); Annot., 93
A.L.R.2d 8 (1964).

202. 173 Misc. 39, 13 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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provides that they may not be released and extinguished by the donee ...
Thus, it is settled law in all jurisdictions, including New York, that beneficial
powers may be surrendered, released or renounced by the grantee and
thereby extinguished." ' 20 3 Admittedly, the position taken by Professors Simes
and Smith and the dictum in Merrill point strongly toward a right of a donee
to disclaim a power notwithstanding the existence of a statute. Nevertheless,
it would seem to be an undue risk to accept such a conclusion in absence of
stronger primary authority. In Merrill, for example, the issue was the right
to release the power - not the right to disclaim.
There is wide variation in the types of statutory authority for disclaimer
by the donee of a power. Massachusetts, for example, has detailed provisions
concerning releases of powers of appointment by a donee, followed by a
provision that a donee of a power can disclaim in the same manner and to
205
the same extent that he can release.2 0 4 The statute contains broad language:
203. Id. at 49, 18 N.Y.S2d at 526-27.
204. MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 204, §§27-34 (1958).
205. Id. at §27. Absent authorization from the testator for the donee of a fiduciary
power to disclaim, there are likely to be restrictions on such a disclaimer even in a state
with a statute as broad as the one in Massachusetts. Sherry v. Little, 341 Mass. 224, 167
N.E.2d 872 (1960), though not specifically addressed to the release and disclaimer statutes,
seems relevant. H died Jan. 11, 1956, leaving his residual estate in two trusts -a "Marital
Deduction Trust" and a trust with lifetime benefits for W with remainders to his issue.
W and T were named coexecutrices and cotrustees with "ordinary powers" and, in addition,
a controlling power of decision ("veto power") in W. On Nov. 8, 1956, W executed a
written renunciation of the "veto power." Subsequently W and the other beneficiaries
petitioned for a determination of the validity of W's attempted renunciation. The trial
court entered a final decree that the purported waiver was null and void on grounds that
W was not "fully informed as to the nature and effect of the instrument and [did not have]
a proper knowledge and understanding of its significance, and that the said instrument was
signed without notice to the beneficiaries and without approval of the court . . . ." Id. at
228, 167 NX.2d at 874-75. The decree was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, with the additional observation: "The power ...
is an integral part of the
testator's plan for the administration of his estate. .. . The executrices having accepted
the trust are obligated to administer it according to the terms prescribed by the testator
subject to the supervision of the Probate Court.... Neither can resign without its consent.
...
Nor can they depart from the directions of the testator except by leave of court and
'then only 'upon proof of the most pressing exigency.' . . . There is no evidence of present
or impending necessity... We think that the attempted relinquishment of the controlling
power by [V] without notice to the other beneficiaries and without the approval of the
court, was of no legal effect and that her agreement to confirm and effect the renunciation
upon request by [7] amounted to an engagement to commit a breach of trust. It was a
promise by a fiduciary to act in violation of her duties and was invalid...." Id. at 229,
167 N.E2d at 875.
One commentator writes: "The controlling power of decision given the widow was an
administrative power and as such appears to be beyond the purview of [Mass.] G.L., c. 204,
Sec. 27, permitting the complete or partial release of a power of appointment." 1960 ANNUAL
SuRvEY OF MAssAcyusErrs LAW §211, at 22-23. It may be inaccurate to assume that the
court's decision turned on whether the power was within the purview of the statute; decision could have rested upon the finding that the "instrument was signed without notice
to the beneficiaries and without approval of the court" since the statute requires such
notice.
In any event, the trust theory declared, though perhaps by dictum, is sound: "Once a

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1968], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

A power of appointment, whether or not coupled with an interest, and
whether or not existing at the time [the] section takes effect, and
whether the power is held by the donee in an individual or in a fiduciary capacity may be released wholly or partially, by the donee thereof,
unless otherwise expressly provided in the instrument creating the
power. . . . [T]he term power of appointment includes all powers
whether they are: (a) general, special, or otherwise; (b) in gross,
appendant, simply collateral, in trust, or otherwise; (c) exercisable
by will, deed, deed or will, or instrument amending a trust, or otherwise; (d) exercisable presently or in the future.
A possible criticism of the Massachusetts type of legislation is the failure
to separate clearly the concepts of disclaimer and release. It is apparent that
Congress considers disclaimers and releases to be different legal concepts
producing substantially different tax results.26 For example, property subject

to a general power of appointment created after October 21, 1942, will be
included in decedent's gross estate under section 2041 (a) (2) if decedent
possesses the power at the time of his death or has at any time exercised or
released it. Additional language provides that a disclaimer shall not be
deemed a release. Thus, if the power is released, the property that is subject
to it is includible in the donee's gross estate; if the power is disclaimed,
the property is not includible.
Minnesota has included the following language in its statutory definitions
of "interest": "[P]ower to appoint, consume, apply or expend property or any
other right, power, privilege or immunity relating thereto." 20 7
This language should overcome a possible problem in construing the
meaning of interest as used in section 2056 (d) (2). It is arguable that the
legislature did not intend that the word power be included within the
meaning of the words interest in property. The basis for such an argument
is that section 2055 (a) refers to the "disclaimer of a bequest, legacy, devise,
transfer, or power." The legislative history of section 2055 (a), however,
reveals that the disclaimer language was added for two specific purposes:
(1) to clarify the law that a charitable deduction for a residuary bequest or
devise includes an amount that falls into the residuary estate as a result of
trustee has accepted a trust, he should be bound by the terms of the instrument, and should
be permitted to deviate from the terms of a granted power only upon proof of present or
impending necessity." Id.
206. See generally W. LEAcdS & J. LOGAN, CASES AND TEXT ON FUTURE INTEREsrs AND
ESTATE PLANNING 565-68

(1961); 1 W. NOSSAMAN & J. WYATr, TRUST ADMINIsrRATION AND
TAXATION §3614 rev. 2d ed. 1967). The NOSSAMAN & WYATT treatise states in §36.14, at 714:

"There is a technical difference in that the release of a power is to a certain extent an
affirmative act exercising dominion over it, whereas renunciation or disclaimer is a negative
act, a refusal to accept." The authors then cite Botzum v. Havana Nat'l Bank, 367 Ill. 539, 12
N.E.2d 203 (1937), a case that is primarily concerned with whether all the beneficiaries of
a trust have consented to the termination of a trust, but which implies that a donee of a
general power of appointment may refuse to accept the power: "[N]o title or interest
in the thing vests in a donee of a power by the creation of that power alone. It amounts
to a virtual offer to him of the estate or fund, and he may accept or reject it at will, and
no title can vest thereby until he accepts the offer. [Citations omitted.]" Id. at 543; 12
N.E.2d at 205.
207. MINN. STAT. ANN. § §501.211, 525-532 (1) (b) (Supp. 1966).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol21/iss1/1

32

Finnell: Disclaimers and the Marital Deduction: A Need for Adequate State
1968]

DISCLAIMERS AND THE MARITAL DEDUCTION

a disclaimer; and (2) to permit the donee of a power to disclaim the power
in order to save an otherwise qualifying gift to charity.2 08 The purpose of the
disclaimer provision under section 2056 (d) (2) is not so restricted.2 0 9 Therefore, it seems fair to conclude that the additional words in section 2055 (a),
that is, "bequest, legacy, devise, transfer, or power," are restrictive, and that
the absence of such restrictive words in section 2056 (d) (2) calls for the
2 10
broadest possible interpretation.
Even if it were shown that the legislature did not intend that the words
interest in property include power, an argument could still be made that
disclaimer of a power to cure the marital deduction would be effective.
Section 2056 (d) (2), before the amendment, prohibited increasing the marital
deduction by disclaimer by providing that "such interest shall . . . be considered as passing . . . not to the surviving spouse, but to the person who

made the disclaimer." 211 To prove that power was not included within interest
in property is to concede that the former section 2056 (d) (2) was not appli2 12
cable to disclaimers of powers.
208. The disclaimer language of CODE §2055 (a) was added to the CODE by The Revenue
Bill of 1942. The purpose of the bill is explained in H.R. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 166-67
(1942).
The purpose of the amendment to §812(d) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939 was considered
at length in Commissioner v. Macaulay's Estate, 150 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1945). Pertinent facts
were: Decedent specifically bequeathed $1 million to H and gave 46% of her residuary
estate to charity. Before the effective date of the amendment to §812(d), H disclaimed
$428,750 of the bequest, causing it to fall into the residuary estate. The executor took a
charitable deduction for 46% of the disclaimed interest. The issue was whether the 1942
amendment was passed to clarify or declare existing law, or whether it was passed to change
the existing law. It was the opinion of the court that the amendment was intended to be
applicable to two different situations: (1) the specific charitable bequest which, pursuant
to a power, could be diverted to other purposes, and (2) the disclaimed legacy which would
fall into the residuary estate bequeathed to charity (and in both cases the setting of a
definite limit within which a disclaimer must be made to render a legacy deductible). The
court held that as to the latter, ie., disclaiming a legacy, the effect of the amendment was
only to clarify and give "persuasive and weighty interpretation of the scope of a preexisting
exemption" (aside from setting a time limit). It was noted that as to the former, i.e.,
certain powers, the amendment allowed a greater exemption after Feb. 10, 1939, but was not
intended to alter the status of renounced legacies. Id. at 851.
209. See supra notes 136, 137 and accompanying text; infra note 210 and accompanying
text.
210. Professor Casner included the following in his 1967 Supplement: "It is submitted
that the new provisions should be construed liberally to carry out the underlying intent to
enable persons, after the death of a deceased spouse, to refuse to accept something and
thereby improve the marital deduction picture. The refusal to accept a power should
be construed as a disclaimer of an 'interest' and the freedom from having her interest
diverted by the exercise of the power disclaimed should be construed as entitling the surviving spouse 'to receive such interest."' 1 CASNER at 828 n.92.
211. CODE §2056(a) permits a deduction only for "an interest in property which
passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse ...." See generally 1 CASNER
at 827-31.
212. However, it would seem that this reasoning is somewhat circuitous, since the
purposes of CODE §2055 (a) specifically included permitting the donee of a power to disclaim
in addition to clarifying the existing law as to disclaimers of bequests or devises. See supra
notes 208, 209 and accompanying text.
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It is important to determine whether a disclaimer of a power is authorized, for it is this type of disclaimer that can be of greatest use in saving the
marital deduction. Numerous fact situations can be presented where an
interest passing to W, which is a nonqualifying terminable interest, could be
qualified if an outstanding power in a third-party donee could be extinguished
or shifted to W.
Suppose, for example, that H's will leaves the residue in a trust, of which
W and her estate are the sole beneficiaries except for a power in T to pay
funds to D, a minor, in an emergency. The trust is a qualifying "Estate
213
Trust" but for the power.
Or suppose that the residue is left in a trust that would qualify under
section 2056 (b) (5) as a "Marital Deduction Trust" but for a power in the
trustee to allocate receipts and disbursements between income and corpus
(and it is known that the local courts do not impose reasonable limitations
on the exercise of such a power) .214
In both examples, an effective disclaimer of the power would save the
marital deduction. In the first example, it would seem that T could not
disclaim his power because of his fiduciary duty to D. 215 The second example
does not pose such a clearly defined duty, however, and a disclaimer of the
power would probably be consistent with the testator's presumed intent.216
Interests Passing by Nontestamentary Transfers
In addition to the testamentary transfers discussed above, decedent's gross
estate may include property transferred during his lifetime.217 The general
principles pertaining to the disclaimer of testamentary transfers also apply
to interests received by deed, assignment, or inter vivos trust agreement. 218
There are some additional problems, however, that deserve separate consideration.
(a). Interests Passing by Insurance Contracts, Joint Bank Accounts,
Tenancies by the Entirety, and Joint Tenancies with Right of Suruivorship
Proceeds of insurance are specifically recognized as an interest in property
that may "pass" from decedent to the surviving spouse and thereby qualify
213. See 1 CASNE.R

at

840.

214. Treas. Reg. §20.2056 (b)-5 (1958) provides that such an "administrative power"
will not disqualify the interest in trust "if the entire terms of the instrument are such that
the local courts will impose reasonable limitations upon the exercise of the powers."
215. Cf. supra note 205.
216. The instrument should contain a clause indicating intent and providing for disclaimer of the power. See 2 CASNER at 1255.
217. Lifetime transfers that may be includible in decedent's gross estate include transactions in contemplation of death, CODE §2035; transfers with retained life estate, CoDE
§2036; transfers taking effect at death, CoDE §2037; revocable transfers, CODE §2038; joint
interests, CODE §2040; transfers for insufficient consideration, CODE §2043.
218. Cf., e.g., A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 695 (lst ed. 1951,
Supp. 1959 & 1964) (requirement of acceptance of deed).
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for the estate tax marital deduction. 2 19 Furthermore, it is generally assumed
that, as a matter of state law, insurance proceeds can be disclaimed - the
theory being that such proceeds are more analogous to a testamentary gift
than to the interest of an intestate taker.220 Such a conclusion seems correct,
but the paucity of direct authority suggests a need for closer analysis.
The beneficiary of a life insurance policy is a donee beneficiary of a thirdparty beneficiary contract.221 The Restatement of Contracts, takes the position
that: "[A] donee beneficiary . . . who has not previously assented to the

promise for his benefit, may in a reasonable time after learning of its existence
and terms, render the duty to himself inoperative from the beginning by
2
disclaimer, unless such action is a fraud on creditors.122
Although there are few cases on point, 222 the question of a third-party
beneficiary's right to disclaim was recently considered in Hershey v. Bowers2 24
in the context of a joint and survivorship bank deposit account. The issue
was this: If A deposits his own funds in a joint and survivorship deposit
account in the name of A and B, without B's knowledge or consent, can B,
upon discovering such fact after A's death, validly disclaim the interest?
The court held that B could disclaim, upon the theory of a third-party
beneficiary contract. As a result, the funds did not pass to B and were not
taxed to B as a taxable succession. The court recognized that the succession
tax statute225 treated survivorship property as a succession of the same
status as property bequeathed by will; therefore, it turned its decision on
the analogous right of a legatee to disclaim and thereby avoid levy of the
succession tax.
An earlier Ohio case deciding that an interest in a joint and survivorship
bank account could be disclaimed is In re Estate of Krakoff.226 The probate
court considered the beneficiary-heir dichotomy and analogized the contractual arrangement to a succession created by will: "In the case of property

219.

CODE §2056 (e) (7).

220. See, e.g., Lentz at 316; Sayles at 539; cf. Treas. Reg. 2056(d)-1 (b), last sentence
(the regulation under prior law which impliedly recognizes the possibility of disclaiming
insurance proceeds). An authority often cited for the right to disclaim insurance proceeds
is Estate of Mabel E. Morton, 12 T.C. 380 (1949). But see text accompanying supra notes
26, 27 where it is shown that the question in Morton was whether election of an optional
mode of settlement constitutes acceptance. See also Estate of John Joseph Tuohy, Jr., 14 T.C.
245 (1950); Rundle v. Welch, 5 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1916 (S.D. Ohio 1960) (cases that, like
Morton, deal with election of settlement options rather than disclaimer of the right to the
proceeds).
221. 4 A. CoRBIN,

CoNTcrs §782, at 81

(1951, Supp 1964) [hereinafter cited as

CoRmN].

222.

REsTATEMENT OF Co~mAc'rs

223. See 4 CoRI

§137 (1932).

§811, at 236-37.

224. 7 Ohio St. 2d 4, 218 NXE.2d 455 (1966). The lower courts had rendered conflicting
decisions in In re Bauer's Estate, 91 Ohio L. Abs. 162, 191 N.E.2d 859 (P. Ct., Fulton Co.
1962), aff'd, Ct. App., Fulton Co., Ohio; In re Hershey's Estate, 1 Ohio App. 2d 511, 205
N.E.2d 590 (1965), af'd, 7 Ohio St. 2d 4, 218 N.E.2d 455 (1966).
225.

OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §5731.02 (Page 1954, Supp. 1966).

226. 87 Ohio L. Abs. 387, 180 Ohio Op. 2d 116, 179 N.E.2d 566 (P. Ct., Franklin Co.
1961).
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passing under a will, the testator directs his personal representative to
distribute to his legatee; in this case, the owner directs the bank to pay

' 22
money after death to a designated survivor." 7

The theory of a third-party beneficiary contract would not be applicable
to the traditional concurrent tenancies with survivorship- the tenancy by
the entirety and the joint tenancy. 2 s Nevertheless, in some circumstances the
survivor would probably have the right to disclaim upon the theory that
acceptance is required before a deed of property is effective. 2 29
Assume, for example, that H paid the total consideration for the jointly
held property and that the coowner did not learn of the coownership until
H's death.230 Subject to the usual limitations of disclaimer within a reasonable time and before acceptance, the surviving tenant would have the right
to disclaim the initial transfer into H's and his names jointly.2 31 Note, how-

ever, that the right to disclaim must be judged from the point of the initial
conveyance;

232
Of
the survivor does not take from the deceased coowner.

course, all such property is includible in H's gross estate under section 2040
and is treated as "passing" from H to the surviving tenant under section
2056 (e). Nevertheless, in determining the state-law effect of a disclaimer of
an interest received in joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety, or the interest
received as survivor of one of these tenancies, it must be remembered that
acceptance or disclaimer must be judged from the date of the initial conveyance.
Now to consider the effects of disclaiming interests received by nontestamentary transfers: Life insurance proceeds offer an ideal vehicle for either
increasing the estate tax marital deduction by means of a disclaimer under
section 2056 (d) (2) or decreasing the deduction by a disclaimer under
2056 (d) (1). Assume, for example, that H owned three policies of life insurance on his life, 233 one payable to each of W, S, and D. If the disclaimer is
valid under controlling state law, and if W is the secondary beneficiary of
the policies payable to S and D, a disclaimer of the proceeds by S or D would
pass additional qualifying property to W. Conversely, if the goal were to"
decrease the marital deduction, and if the secondary beneficiaries were suitable objects, W could simply disclaim the proceeds payable to her.
Special questions may arise, though, in disclaiming insurance proceeds
because of the different settlement options that are available. 23 4 For example,
227. Id. at 592, 180 Ohio Op. 2d at 118, 179 N.E.2d at 569.
228. See generally for discussion of characteristics of joint tenancies and tenancies by
the entirely 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§6.2, .3, .6 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 1 CASNER
at 400-01.
229. See supra note 218.
230. Under CODE §2040, the value of concurrently owned property with right of survivorship is includible in H's estate to the extent of the consideration paid by H. If the
coowner knows of the transfer, questions of disclaiming within a reasonable time are raised.
Cf. text following supra subheading Timely Disclaimer.
231. In re Bute's Estate, 355 Pa. 170, 49 A.2d 539 (1946) (permitted renunciation of
interest as tenant by entirety).
232. E.g., In re Gerling's Estate, 303 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1957).
233. These policies are includible in H's gross estate under CODE §2042 (2).
254. See generally 1 CASNER at 284-502; Scott, Life Insurance Options, 56 HARV. L. REv.
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S's or D's disclaimer might increase the marital deduction if the contingent
beneficiary is the trustee of a qualified "Estate Trust" or "Marital Deduction
Trust" for benefit of W. Likewise, the deduction could be increased if the
option gives S,or the contingent beneficiary, W, a life annuity with no refund
feature so that the interest when disclaimed by S will pass directly to W
and upon her death no benefits will pass to another.23 5
On the other hand, if there is any interest that will continue beyond W's
life (for example, a contingent beneficiary to take the commuted value of
any unpaid installments upon the death of W), then the interest is a non36
qualifying terminable interest.
An additional word of caution: The vesting language of Hardenbergh23T
might present a problem in connection with disclaiming life insurance
proceeds because of the question of whether a life insurance beneficiary's
interest is vested subject to divestment or is an expectancy. 238 A reasonable
answer to such an assertion should be that "ideas behind such terms as
'expectancy' and 'vested rights' are altogether too variable and uncertain to
justify their use as a basis for decision. They are often used to describe a
result that has been reached for reasons of policy that are in some degree
made manifest."239 Nevertheless, this recurring Hardenbergh threat will be
alleviated only by comprehensive state legislation that provides, inter alia,
24 0
that a beneficiary of an insurance contract can disclaim.
If the donee of a third-party beneficiary contract disclaims his right under
the contract, the property so disclaimed will revert to H's estate2 41 thereby
passing as part of his probate estate. 242 A similar result will obtain if the
cotenant disclaims the conveyance. 243 Thus, the disclaimed interest will
probably pass under the residuary clause of H's will, or, if there is no will,
244
by intestacy.
(b).

Special Problems in Disclaiming Interests Passing Under
Nontestamentary Transfers

A major problem in disclaiming an interest passing from H during H's
24 5
lifetime is avoiding the claim that the interest has already been accepted,
24 6
or that it has not been disclaimed within a reasonable time.
1147 (1943).

235.

Cf.

236.
237.
238.

See Rev. Rul. 55-733, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 388; Cf. 1 CASNER at 867.
See text accompanying supra notes 141-60.
Cf. 3A Comm §742.
4 Comm §887, at 566.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §501.211 (1) (a) (Supp. 1966).
Cf. id.

239.
240.
241.

1 CASNER at 867.

242. The failure of the transfer to the third-party donee will result in inclusion under
§2033 rather than §2040.

CoDE

243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
See text accompanying supra notes 164, 167.
See text following supra subheading Refusal To Accept.
See text following supra subheading Timely Disclaimer.
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The acceptance problem is illustrated by Estate of Ida F. Doane,247 in
which the interest in question was the corpus of an inter vivos trust. Decedent,
during her lifetime, retained all rights to the income, the corpus to be distributed as she directed in her will. Decedent's sister served as cotrustee with
decedent. Decedent's will directed that the property be distributed to the
sister, but "trusting that she will carry out my wishes and intentions." It
was apparent that decedent wanted the property distributed to charity, so the
sister filed a timely disclaimer. The Commissioner argued on the authority
of Cerf v. Commissioner24s that the sister accepted the interest during
decedent's lifetime by serving as cotrustee. The court observed, however, that
the trustee's interest was not a beneficial interest during decedent's lifetime
as it was in Cerf. Thus, the disclaimer was held to be effective.
On the other hand, there are many lifetime transfers that will set forth
the beneficial disposition at transferor's death. A typical predeath arrangement 240 is for H to transfer property to T in trust to pay the income and
principal as H may direct during his lifetime (and to H and W during H's
life within discretion of T in the event of H's incapacity) ; H retains the right
to revoke and amend the trust during his lifetime, and at his death, the
trust is to be divided into a "Marital Deduction Trust" and the balance is
to be divided into separate trusts for the primary benefit of each of H's
children. During H's lifetime the trust may or may not be funded. In any
event it is likely that the majority of the corpus of the trust will be received
at H's death, that is, when life insurance proceeds are paid and assets are
received in "pour-over" under the terms of H's will.
It would seem unreasonable to require W or the children either to accept
or disclaim during H's lifetime even if they had knowledge of the trust.
Arguably, however, their interests, though defeasible and uncertain in
amount, are offered at date of execution of the trust, thus requiring disclaimer within a "reasonable time" thereafter.
In considering a disclaimer of any nonprobate property, one must always
consider the effect of a "formula marital deduction gift" 25 ° in H's will. The
result of a disclaimer of nonprobate assets may simply be to substitute the
disclaimed interest for benefits under the will since, once the maximum
deduction is reached, additional qualifying gifts of nonprobate property
result in a corresponding decrease in the amount of the testamentary property produced by the formula. 251 Presumably, the new disclaimer technique
will normally be utilized when the marital deduction is underqualified. The
technique may be utilized to shift interests to W even though the marital
deduction is fully qualified, since the disclaimed interest would avoid imposi52
tion of gift tax liability.2

247.
248.

249.
250.
251.
252.

10 T.C. 1258 (1948).
141 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1944).
See, e.g., 2 CASNER at 1235.
See generally I CASNER 791-97.
Cf. Lentz at 326 nA2.
See supra note 58.
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PART

III.

CONCLUSION

The new disclaimer provision, though passed to alleviate existing inequities and hardships, is attended by an inordinate number of risks. Hopefully, the
amendment will be broadly construed in keeping with the legislative purpose.
Nevertheless, the well-advised taxpayer will disclaim an interest only after a
thorough investigation of -the probable consequences.
These basic questions should always be considered:
(1) Is augmentation of the marital deduction worth the price
of an irrevocable refusal to accept the property?
(2) Is it a certainty that the disclaimed interest will pass to the
surviving spouse?
(3) Will the interest pass in a form that qualifies for the marital
deduction?
(4) Will the disclaimer comply with the specific requirements of
section 2056 (d) (2) ?
(5) What risk is there that a disclaimer, though effective for augmarital deduction, might still be held to be a taxable
menting 25the
3
transfer?
law?(6) Will the disclaimer be effective under the controlling state
Answering the last question should not be difficult in a state such as
Minnesota. But in a state that has inadequate or no statutory disclaimer
laws, the disclaimer may be ineffective or the effects thereof may be so uncertain as to make it an undue risk. In either case, the taxpayer's planning
efforts may be thwarted unnecessarily.
The most urgent state legislative needs are specific authorization to
disclaim for an intestate taker and the donee of a power. Absent statutory
authority, it is doubtful whether these interests can be disclaimed. Another
need is recognition of the right to accept part of an interest and disclaim
the remainder, with dear statement of the ways in which an interest can
be divided.
Stopgap legislation is no longer adequate. Not only is there threat of
gift tax liability; now there is also potential loss of an increased estate tax
marital deduction.
Therefore, it is imperative that each state enact comprehensive legislation
stating dearly who can disclaim, the interests that can be disclaimed, the
method of disclaiming, the circumstances that constitute a disclaimer, and
the effects of the disclaimer.

253. Of course there is a constant danger that a supposed "disclaimer" will be held
to be a taxable transfer. See text accompanying supra notes 33, 35, 58, 141, 148. A seemingly
untenable result would be to hold that an attempted disclaimer met all the requirements
under the marital deduction section, yet still was a taxable transfer for gift tax purposes.
The cautious taxpayer should be aware, however, that such an anomalous result has been
suggested. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

39

Florida Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1968], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

APPENDIX
MINNESOTA DISCLAIMER STATUTES

The Minnesota disclaimer provisions, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§501.211, 525.532 (Supp. 1966),
were approved May 21, 1965. Section 525.532 is set forth verbatim. Section 501.211 is
similar to §525.532; accordingly, only the essential differences in §501.211 are set forth.
525.532 Disclaimer of interests passing by will, intestate succession or under certain
powers of appointment
Subdivision 1. As used in this section, unless otherwise clearly required by the context:
(a) "Beneficiary" means and includes any person entitled, but for his disclaimer, to
take an interest: by intestate succession; by devise; by legacy or bequest; by succession to a
disclaimed interest by will, intestate succession or through the exercise or nonexercise
of a testamentary power of appointment; by virtue of a renunciation and election to take
against a will; as beneficiary of a testamentary trust; pursuant to the exercise or nonexercise of a testamentary power of appointment; as donee of a power of appointment
created by testamentary instrument; or otherwise under a testamentary instrument;
(b) "Interest" means and includes the whole of any property, real or personal, legal or
equitable, or any fractional part, share or particular portion or specific assets thereof or
any estate in any such property or power to appoint, consume, apply or expend property
or any other right, power, privilege or immunity relating there to;
(c) "Disclaimer" means a written instrument which declines, refuses, releases, renounces
or disclaims an interest which would otherwise be succeeded to by a beneficiary, which
instrument defines the nature and extent of the interest disclaimed thereby and which
must be signed, witnessed and acknowledged by the disclaimant in the manner provided
for deeds of real estate.
Subdivision 2. A beneficiary may disclaim any interest in whole or in part, or with
reference to specific parts, shares or assets thereof, by filing a disclaimer in court in the
manner hereinafter provided. A guardian, executor, administrator or other personal representative of the estate of a minor, incompetent or deceased beneficiary, if he deems it in
the best interests of those interested in the estate of such beneficiary and of those who take
the beneficiary's interest by virtue of the disclaimer and not detrimental to the best interests
of the beneficiary, with or without an order of the probate court, may execute and file a
disclaimer on behalf of the beneficiary within the time and in the manner in which the
beneficiary himself could disclaim if he were living, of legal age and competent. A beneficiary likewise may execute and file a disclaimer by agent or attorney so empowered.
Subdivision 3. Such disclaimer shall be filed at any time after the creation of the interest
but in all events within six months after the death of the person by whom the interest was
created or from whom it would have been received, or, if the disclaimant is not finally
ascertained as a beneficiary or his interest has not become indefeasibly fixed both in quality
and quantity as of the death of such person, then such disclaimer shall be filed not later
than six months after the event which would cause him so to become finally ascertained
and his interest to become indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity.
Subdivision 4. Such disclaimer shall be effective upon being filed in probate court in
which the estate of the person by whom the interest was created or from whom it would
have been received is, or has been, administered or, if no probate administration has been
commenced, then in the probate court of any county provided in Minnesota Statutes, Section 525.82, as the place for probate administration of the estate of such person. A copy
of the disclaimer shall be delivered or mailed to the representative, trustee or other person
having legal title to or possession of, the property in which the interest disclaimed exists,
and no such representative, trustee or person shall be liable for any otherwise proper
distribution or other disposition made without actual notice of the disclaimer. If an
interest in or relating to real estate is disclaimed, the original of the disclaimer, or a
copy of the disclaimer certified as true and complete by the clerk of the probate court
wherein the same has been filed, shall be filed in the office of the register of deeds or
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the registrar of titles, as hereinafter provided, in the county or counties where the
real estate is situated and shall constitute notice to all persons only from and after the
time of such filing. If title to such real estate has not been registered under the provisions of Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 508, such disclaimer or certified copy shall be
filed with the register of deeds. If title to such real estate has been registered under the
provisions of Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 508, such disclaimer or certified copy shall be
filed with the registrar of titles.
Subdivision 5. Unless the person by whom the interest was created or from whom it
would have been received has otherwise provided by will or other appropriate instrument
with reference to the possibility of a disclaimer by the beneficiary, the interest disclaimed
shall descend, be distributed or otherwise be disposed of in the same manner as if the
disclaimant had died immediately preceding the death or other event which causes him to
become finally ascertained as a beneficiary and his interest to become indefeasibly fixed
both in quality and quantity, and, in any case, the disclaimer shall relate for all purposes to such date, whether filed before or after such death or other event. However, one
disclaiming an interest in a non-residuary gift, devise or bequest shall not be excluded,
unless his disclaimer so provides, from sharing in a gift, devise or bequest of the residue
even though, through lapse, such residue includes the assets disclaimed. An interest of
any nature in or to the estate of an intestate may be declined, refused or disclaimed as
herein provided without ever vesting in the disclaimant.
Subdivision 6. The right to disclaim otherwise conferred by this section shall be barred
if the beneficiary is insolvent at the time of the event giving rise to the right to disclaim.
Any voluntary assignment or transfer of, or contract to assign or transfer, an interest in
real or personal property, or written waiver of the right to disclaim the succession to an
interest in real or person property, by any beneficiary, or any sale or other disposition of
an interest in real or personal property pursuant to judicial process, made before he has
filed a disclaimer, as herein provided, bars the right otherwise hereby conferred on such
beneficiary to disclaim as to such interest.
Subdivision 7. The right to disclaim granted by this section shall exist irrespective of
any limitation imposed on the interest of the disclaimant in the nature of an express or
implied spendthrift provision or similar restriction. A disclaimer, when filed as provided in this section, or a written waiver of the right to disclaim, shall be binding upon
the disclaimant or beneficiary so waiving and all parties thereafter claiming by, through
or under him, except that a beneficiary so waiving may thereafter transfer, assign or release
his interest if such is not prohibited by an express or implied spendthrift provision. If an
interest in real estate is disclaimed and the disclaimer is duly filed in accordance with the
provisions of subdivision 4 of this section, the spouse of the disclaimant, if such spouse
has consented to the disclaimer in writing, shall thereupon be automatically debarred froni
any spouse's statutory or common law right estate by curtesy or in dower or otherwise in
such real estate to which such spouse, except for such disclaimer, would have been entitled.
Subdivision 8. This section shall not abridge the right of any person, apart from this
section, under any existing or future statute or rule of law, to disclaim any interest or to
assign, convey, release, renounce or otherwise dispose of any interest.
Subdivision 9. Any interest which exists on May 22, 1965 but which has not then become
indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity, or the taker of which has not then become
finally ascertained, may be disclaimed after May 22, 1965 in the manner provided herein.
Added Laws 1967, c. 552, section 1.
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501.211 Disclaimer of interests passing by deed, assignment, under certain non-testamentary instruments or under certain powers of appointment
Subdivision 1. As used in this section, unless otherwise clearly required by context:
(a) "Beneficiary" means and includes any person entitled, but for his disclaimer, to take
an interest: as grantee; as donee; under any assignment or instrument of conveyance or
transfer; by succession to a disclaimed interest, other than by will, intestate succession or
through the exercise or nonexercise of a testamentary power of appointment; as beneficiary of an inter vivos trust or insurance contract; pursuant to the exercise or nonexercise
of a nontestamentary power of appointment; as donee of a power of appointment created
by a nontestamentary instrument; or otherwise under any nontestamentary instrument.
(b) ....
(c)....
Subdivision 2 .....
Subdivision 3. Such disclaimer shall be filed at any time after the creation of the interest,
but in all events within six months after the effective date of the nontestamentary instrument creating the interest ....
Subdivision 4. Such disclaimer shall be effective upon being filed in any district court of
the State of Minnesota....
Subdivision 5. Unless otherwise provided in the nontestamentary instrument creating
the interest with reference to the possibility of a disclaimer by the beneficiary, the interest
disclaimed shall be distributed or otherwise be disposed of in the same manner as if the
disclaimant had died immediately preceding the death or other event which causes him to
become finally ascertained as a beneficiary and his interest to become indefeasibly fixed
both in quality and quantity and, in any case, the disclaimer shall relate for all purposes to
that date, whether filed before or after such death or other event. However, one disclaiming an interest in a non-residuary gift under a trust instrument or otherwise shall
not be excluded, unless his disclaimer so provides, from sharing in a gift of the residue
even though, through lapse, such residue includes the assets disclaimed.
Subdivision 6. The right to disclaim otherwise conferred by this section shall be barred
if the beneficiary is insolvent ....
Subdivision 7.
Subdivision 8.
Subdivision 9.
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